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THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Master of Arts 
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Title: On the Concept of Sin in the Theology of Liberation and Josiah Royce’s The 
Problem of Christianity: Towards a Theo-Philosophical Ethics 
 
 
 This essay proposes that theology and philosophy are not mutually exclusive or at 
odds with one another methodologically, but in fact that religious categories are useful in 
philosophical analyses, and particularly when it comes to ethics. In this essay, I examine 
the theological concept of sin as it is expressed in Latin American Liberation Theology 
(over and against the more traditional understanding of sin in Western Christianity) as the 
domination of the Other and the oppression of the poor through geo-political systems of 
power. I explore the responses to this notion from the Magisterium of the Roman 
Catholic Church, as well as my own critiques in terms of theoretical integrity with 
particular regard to claims of universalism. The essay then proceeds into a synthesis of 
these criticisms through the work of Josiah Royce on Community and Loyalty in The 
Problem of Christianity. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: A THEO-PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE 
 
A. On the Border between Theology and Philosophy 
 Interdisciplinary analysis has become the watchword of the postmodern age: yet 
at the same time to work on the border between philosophy and theology has gradually 
fallen into disrepute in modern times. One reason for this could be that theology is 
considered a closed system, a self-referential discourse of justification for superstition 
and abstract theorization. On the other hand, philosophy has indulged itself more and 
more in claims of being “scientific,” which has caused the fields of metaphysics and 
transcendental ethics to be devalued. And while the divorce of philosophy and theology 
may not in reality be as complete as it seems to be in the world of Academia, it is 
certainly the case that the closeness the two schools of thought once enjoyed is no longer 
so prominent a feature of intellectual discourse. Yet it was not too long ago that judicious 
analyses of religious phenomena and theoretical questions were undertaken by many 
philosophers. Josiah Royce, at the outset of his book The Problem of Christianity, 
describes the interests of the religiously minded scholar in the following manner: 
The modern student of the problems of religion in general, or of Christianity in 
particular, may see good reason for agreeing with the apologists…in attributing to 
Christianity, viewed simply as a product of human evolution, a central importance 
in history, in the religious experience of our race, and in the endlessly renewed, 
 2
yet very ancient, endeavor of mankind to bring to pass, or to move towards, the 
salvation of man.
1
 
What students of both philosophy and religion truly seek is the truth of what is best for 
human beings: how best to live, how best to know, how best to act. Yet the diminution of 
the transcendent (the metaphysically ‘real’) that came about through Modernity and its 
subsequent responses also had the effect of calling into question the possibility of ethical 
maxims that could transcend the particular. With the development of anthropology and 
the subsequent parsing of culture and language along geo-political lines (particularly 
through the pseudo-scientific racism of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century),the ‘humankind’ 
of Modernity came to be broken into ever smaller groups of “humans,” making the 
establishment of an overarching praxis all the more impossible. It is as a response to this 
particularity and relativism that the orientation towards religious questions and systems 
of belief becomes pertinent, proposing to investigate ideas that are ordered towards the 
unity of humanity in experience and existence in and through the purview of the Divine. 
 When it comes to these kinds of ethical questions, religious systems have often 
been viewed with skepticism as overly exclusive, with set categories and closed systems 
of justification: yet juxtaposed to the exclusion of the absolute through cultural 
relativism, and with a critical and historical appreciation for pluralistic interpretation, 
religious ethics, and Christian ethics in particular, can be seen as fruitful sources for the 
analysis of human agency. The present essay proceeds with this potentiality in mind. 
 
                                                 
1
 Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, foreword by Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J., 5
th
 ed. (Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 2001), 60. 
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B. Sin as an Ethical Concept 
Drawing the kind of sharp distinction that many philosophers prefer to use to 
separate the discourses of ethical and religious activity renders any discussion of sin 
entirely incoherent, precisely because the concept of sin is proper to both ethical behavior 
and religious experience. Identifying an action as a sin evokes all of the negative meaning 
of ethical terms like “crime” or “violation,” yet ‘sin’ also connotes a hidden lair of 
meaning that goes beyond the merely practical effects of ethics to the ontological level of 
human agents. As Josef Pieper writes in The Concept of Sin, 
Sin is an inner contortion whose essence is misconstrued if we interpret it as 
sickness or, to descend into an even more trivializing level, merely as an 
infraction against conventional rules of behavior…On the contrary, sin in its 
reality means a failure that has been committed before a superhuman judging 
power who longs for reconciliation.
2
 
According to Pieper, though the term itself is utterly out of vogue in most discourses on 
ethics, sin nonetheless continues to be an important way of conceiving of ethical 
violations because it denotes the causes and effects of human praxis at the highest of 
level of being (the judgment of God) and the most fundamental level of the self (the 
‘soul’). 
 I share Pieper’s enthusiasm for this category of analysis, yet also recognize the 
reasons for its disuse. Too often sin has been thought of as the justification for some 
punishment exacted in a posthumous, otherworldly utopia; it has been associated with the 
deterministic ontology of creationism; or it is only seen in terms of the sacerdotal 
practices of the Christian Church. On the other hand, I see the category of sin as 
                                                 
2
 Josef Pieper, The Concept of Sin, trans. Edward T. Oakes (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 7. 
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descriptive of the dynamic experience of human life and the ethical encounters between 
people at odds with one another. I take this to be a pragmatist perspective that orients 
itself towards the lived experience of this notion, yet that does not abandon the idealistic 
theoretical transcendence and absolutely utopian character that this religious category 
entails. What I see in sin that is of value is a universal, total impetus towards ethical 
behavior that responds to and even ameliorates the crimes of this world through the 
creation of a better one here and now.  
 Beyond Pieper and the traditional definition of sin in Western Christianity, I 
propose in this essay to explore how the category of sin is defined by Latin American 
thinkers of the Theology of Liberation, particularly Enrique Dussel, Gustavo Gutierrez, 
and Franz Hinkelammert. The definition of sin given in this system of thought avoids the 
ontological pitfall of overemphasizing the self  that characterizes ththe more mainstream 
definition. Instead, in Liberation Theology the notion of sin is put in terms of human 
praxis, human to human relations, and the process of liberation. The definition is not 
wholly without theoretical weaknesses, though: some of its most vociferous critics are 
high ranking members of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. In the second section 
of the essay I will outline the critiques voiced by Pope John Paul II and Cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), as well as my own view of the shortcomings of the 
definition of sin given in Liberation Theology. In the final section of the essay, I will 
show how the philosophical analysis of communitarian ethics and the understanding of 
sin as the betrayal of the Beloved Community given by Josiah Royce responds to and 
incorporates both my own critiques of some of the ideological biases of Liberation 
Theology and the criticisms voiced by the Magisterium. By providing this thoroughgoing 
 5
analysis of what sin can and should mean in theory and in praxis, I hope to achieve the 
kind of intersectional analysis that overcomes the relativism of modernity and the 
incipient division of philosophy from theology. 
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CHAPTER II 
SIN AND RECONCILIATION IN LIBERATION THEOLOGY 
In order to begin to define the notions of sin and reconciliation at work in 
Theology of Liberation, it is worthwhile to consider how they are situated in relation to 
traditional understandings of sin in the broader context of Western Roman Catholicism, 
since Liberation Theology came out of and in response to this tradition. This section, 
therefore, will proceed from an exposition of the more traditional definition of sin (which 
derives primarily from the works of Thomas Aquinas) to an explication of sin in 
Liberation Theology put in terms of its consonances and discordances with this tradition. 
  
A. Traditional Definitions of Sin 
 
1. The Ontological Basis for Sin 
 It is difficult to define sin in the Western Christian tradition as an ethico-religious 
category of human activity without some grasp of the metaphysical framework 
underlying it. There is in this tradition a prevailing sense of order, regulation, and 
determination established and governed by God that applies to all things from stars and 
rocks to lilies and bears. This divinely planned, meticulously arranged tableau of the 
universe is set in motion by agency, the power to act and effect change, guided by the 
intentionality of divine and human agents. God alone stands independent of the rigor by 
which Nature is given shape, free to will and act with absolute impunity. Creatures 
existing within the universe, on the other hand, are thrust into being already ensnared 
within the limits God has imposed upon them through the very way in which they were 
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created. Pieper explains that “Man’s ‘nature’ can virtually be identified with his 
creaturely status: his being a creature—his coming into the world without his consent—
defines his innermost essence.”
3
 Christian anthropology understands human beings to be 
a special kind of creature endowed with similar capacities to God’s, such as self-
awareness and free willing. Yet while God remains uncreated and absolutely free, the 
freedom of human beings is bound by the constraints imposed upon them by their 
situation in Nature. As Pieper states it, “our reality as creatures” presents us “with the 
standard, the boundary, the norm for our decisions, decisions which are not drawn ‘from 
nothing,’ but are decisions of the creature, as a creature.”
4
 Morality, then, consists in 
judgments of human agency against the standard of creation, and its categories (including 
sin) are not separated “from that same pregiven ontic condition.”
5
 
 Thomas Aquinas’ definition of sin follows directly from this conclusion: “To sin 
is nothing else but to hang back from the good that belongs to one by nature…Everything 
that fights against the inclination of nature is sin.”
6
 In Aquinas’ view, every human 
person is an intentional creation of God: the purpose behind that creation (its final cause) 
comes to inhere then in the creature.
7
 Pieper describes the “inclination of nature” as the 
“hidden gravitational pull that is active in each individual regulation of the will. It is the 
fundamental energy by virtue of which human existence presses toward its intended 
                                                 
3
 Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 36. 
 
4
 Ibid, 40-1. 
 
5
 Ibid, 37. 
 
6
 Aquinas, from Summa Theologicae, qtd. in Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 37, 38. 
 
7
 Just as a wheel is crafted with the intention that it roll, and its craftsmanship can be judged based upon 
how well it rolls, so too are humans (as works of God) made with a final cause against which one can 
measure functional efficiency or deficiency. The difference between the wheel and people, however, is that 
human beings are crafted with the capacity to act to promote or inhibit their functionality independently 
(that is, their status as creature is not static but open to change). 
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goal.”
8
 The inclination naturae (“inclination of nature”) can be construed as the final 
cause of a human’s existence: it is the orientation towards a goal that ultimately defines 
what or who one is. Sin can therefore be understood most simply as any assertion of 
agency that impedes this natural tendency towards God’s ends in a person.  
 The human capacity for self-improvement or self-corruption is as much an 
abiding and determinative fact of the universe as the laws of physics. Unlike the motion 
of objects in space, however, human agency is inherently unpredictable: the 
determinative quality of human agency is precisely its indeterminacy. The juxtaposition 
of this reality against the notion that human beings are constrained by their natural 
inclination towards the final cause their creator endowed them with brings into sharp 
relief the danger of sin and why it can function effectively as a category of moral 
judgment. “Being ordered to a goal happens by doing; sin consists in this, it disturbs the 
ordering toward the goal, essentially in a doing.”
9
 According to Aquinas, the telos (end or 
goal) that orients human existence is not only a part of their essential nature, but is the 
defining feature of it, such that the effect of sinning (acting in a way that impedes 
progress to the goal) is a distortion of the very essence of one’s existence.
10
 
 
2. Sin as Missing the Mark 
 The existential effects of sinning upon the individual warrant its consideration as 
an ethical category in the sense that ethics involves the judgment of any assertion of 
                                                 
8
 Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 37. 
 
9
 Aquinas, from Summa Theologicae, qtd. in Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 30. 
 
10
 In his discussion of this point, Pieper describes sin as a distortion of what Heidegger calls Dasein, the 
ground of human existence. See Pieper, 31. 
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agency that has consequences in the world as good or bad. In the Western tradition of 
ethics in general, it is fair to say that one major question in the consideration of human 
action is whether or not the individual is accountable for the effects of the act. This is 
certainly true of sin: according to Aquinas, “In the full sense of the word that act is moral 
that stands entirely and completely in our power.”
11
 Pieper explains that “it also belongs 
to the concept of moral failure, and thus of sin itself, that one must be responsible and 
accountable for it.”
12
 It is interesting to note that even a cursory linguistic analysis of the 
origins of the term “sin” reveals that the issue of culpability through intention is a 
distinctively religious addition. The Hebrew noun תאמח (chatta’t) and the Greek ‛αµαρτία 
(hamartia), the words used in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible that are 
translated into the Latin peccatum, the Spanish pecado, and finally the English word 
“sin,” derive from verbal forms that in their earliest iterations can be translated as “to 
miss the mark.”
13
 In the context of Homer’s Iliad, for instance, αµαρτάνειν refers to a 
warrior throwing his spear at a foe and missing him.
14
 The deficiency in this act is one 
based upon the intention of the warrior: he aims to throw the spear into his enemy, yet 
fails to strike his intended target. Aquinas differentiates this kind of sin, which he calls a 
peccatum in actu artis (a “technical sin”) from peccatum in moralibus (a “moral sin”) in 
two ways: first, the goal that is not achieved in a technical sin is always particular, 
meaning that the failure is discrete and does not violate the ultimate telos of one’s life; 
and second, the goal that is violated in a technical failure always comes from a distinctly 
                                                 
11
 Aquinas, from De Veritate, qtd. in Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 31. 
 
12
 Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 31. 
 
13
 See “αµαρτάνω” in Liddell and Scott, “תאמח” in Brown, Driver, and Briggs (2398). 
 
14
 See Iliad, Book 5, Line 287. 
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human intention, as opposed to that which comes about through the inclination naturae 
(which is identified with God’s intention).
15
 In a similar analogy, one could say that a 
marksman failing to hit a target of his own choosing is committing a technical sin 
because he has merely failed to achieve his own arbitrary goal, and he has only fallen 
short in terms of the techniques and rules of marksmanship, not his basic humanity. 
 The fundamental difference for Aquinas between a technical failure and a truly 
moral sin (one which a person can stand guilty of) relates back to the notion of human 
existence being ordered towards a divine telos. More specifically, Aquinas’ proclivity for 
prizing the ends of human action, and thus the intentions by which they are first 
undertaken, is the foundation for him for how to judge sinful actions. Pieper explains this 
by expanding on the example of the marksman: 
The shot that killed Martin Luther King was no doubt, when considered from a 
purely technical point of view, a brilliantly executed “direct hit.” But the first-
class marksman was also, and by that very fact, a murderer. A surgical 
intervention might well be both a criminal abortion and an extraordinarily well 
done, “successful” operation. Artifex non culpatur [“the artist is not guilty”]. The 
marksman and surgeon, insofar as they have mastered and now possess the 
techniques of their trade, are rather to be praised then accused. Yet as assassin or 
abortionist—that is, when we consider both men as moral persons, or as Thomas 
                                                 
15
 See Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 22-3. Aristotle makes a similar distinction when he employs the term 
αµαρτάνω in Book III of The Nichomachean Ethics, which deals especially with the relation of justice to 
choice, foreknowledge and intention. See especially 1135b. 
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says, inquantum sunt homines [“insofar as they are human”]—their failings 
[Fehlleistungen] are glaring.
16
 
What makes an act sinful, therefore, is its nature as what Pieper calls “an infringement 
against a transhuman, absolute norm” that orients the entirety of one’s existence. In this 
tradition of thought, sin does not reduce to simply falling short of the arbitrary standards 
of human techne (technical arts), but the failure to abide by teleological norms that both 
transcend and constrain the individual in virtue of his or her presence in the created 
world. 
The idea of תאמח (chatta’t), as described by Jacob Milgrom in his commentary on 
the book of Leviticus, has much in common with Aquinas’ understanding of sin as the 
violation of divinely ordered norms. Yet Milgrom argues that תאמח has been 
misconstrued over time because of its translation into Greek as ‛αµαρτία as pertaining to 
the kind of transhuman violations that Aquinas has in mind. Milgrom argues that “The 
very range of the chatta’t in the cult gainsays the notion of sin. For example, this offering 
[to expiate the chatta’t] is enjoined upon recovery from childbirth (chap. 12), the 
completion of the Nazirite vow (Num. 6), and the dedication of the newly constructed 
altar (8:15; see Exod 29:36-7). In other words, the chatta’t is prescribed for persons and 
objects who cannot have sinned.”
17
 Milgrom states that the meaning of chatta’t does not 
have to do with any crime against another person, nor does it have to do with any 
intentional sin: rather, it has to do with the unintentional, inadvertent defilement of the 
sacred by those who are “physically impure.” Milgrom concludes that “the object of the 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, 28. Fehlleistung is the word Pieper uses throughout this chapter as the translation of ‛αµαρτία in its 
non-religious meaning. 
 
17
 Jacob Milgrom, The Anchor Bible: Leviticus 1-16: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary, Vol. 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 253. 
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chatta’t purgation…[is] the sanctuary and its sancta. By daubing the alter with the 
chatta’t blood or by bringing it inside the sanctuary…the priest purges the most sacred 
objects and areas of the sanctuary on behalf of the person who caused their contamination 
by his physical impurity or inadvertent offense.”
18
 What this shows is that chatta’t refers 
to a violation against the impersonal sacred that Milgrom cannot bring himself to call a 
sin, yet that nonetheless fits within the sense of a violation of a “transhuman, absolute 
norm.” Moreover, it is remarkable that this kind of unintentional violation nonetheless 
requires reconciliation or atonement through ritual purification. In this way, the idea of 
chatta’t contains elements of both the technical and moral definitions of peccatum that 
Aquinas gives, providing a novel middle ground between the purely non-religious Greek 
sense of ‛αµαρτία and Aquinas’ theo-ethical peccatum in moralibus. 
 
3. The Causes and Effects of Sin 
In Aquinas’ view, all sin is “inordinatio quae excludit ordinem finis ultimi 
[disorder that excludes the order of the ultimate end (telos)].”
19
 Sins are violations of the 
teleological principles that order the universe, and their consequences are seen in the 
warping of the sinner’s very soul. The realization that such a violation is even possible is 
a result of the nature of the human situation: simultaneously free to will and yet bound to 
a telos not of our choosing. As Pieper puts it, “We never can sin with the unreserved 
power of our will, never without an inner reservation, never with one’s whole 
heart…because sin always takes place by going against the natural [naturhaften] impulse 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, 256. 
 
19
 Aquinas, from De Malo, qtd. in Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 49. 
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of the sinner himself.”
20
 When one commits a sin, it is never total, because insofar as one 
is a member of the created world (which on this account we all are), one is always 
beholden to the ends dictated by that status as creature. Rather, as Aquinas puts it, “Evil 
is never striven for in the manner of turning toward something, but only by turning away 
from something. Thus one says something is ‘good’ by virtue of its participation in the 
good, but something is ‘evil’ only by virtue of its distance from the good.”
21
 Because 
human agency is as much a product of divine craftsmanship as the body and mind, it 
likewise comes pre-programmed towards a specific telos: the good. Thus any assertion of 
agency in the direction of evil constitutes a turning away from its essential tendency 
towards the divine order: “Fit iniuria ipsi Deo, ordinatori naturae.”
22
 
Sin, then, has consequences as a violation of nature (the warping of the self as it 
wars with its nature as creature), and as an injury against God (construed both as the 
impersonal order of the universe and as the person who creates that order). Beyond this, 
Aquinas also describes sin as actus contra rationem, an act “contrary to reason.” Pieper 
explains that “sin goes contrary to reason by a deliberate act committed with full and 
clear understanding of what one is doing and with full responsibility (which is precisely 
what makes sin, as people say, that much ‘crazier’!”
23
 Sin cannot even be recognized as 
such without reason: “reason is the window or mirror through which and in which the 
objective Logos of things becomes manifest to us…Reason is not some neutral or passive 
medium; it is the living power that opens up for us the reality of the world and of 
                                                 
20
 Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 38. 
 
21
 Aquinas, from Summa Theologicae, qtd. in Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 59. 
 
22
 Aquinas, from De Malo, qtd. in Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 49. “He injures God Himself, the Designer of 
Nature.” 
 
23
 Pieper, The Concept of Sin, 42. 
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existence.”
24
 The anthropology given here not only presupposes an independent will and 
a divinely motivated spirit, but also a faculty of reason that can unequivocally shed light 
upon the world. The capacity for true and real knowledge is of vital importance to the 
notion of sin, according to Pieper, because “sin cannot be an inadvertent mistake 
[Versehen: an overlooking of something]. Unwilled lapse is never sin.”
25
 This point 
returns to the distinction between a technical and moral lapse: only the moral lapse, 
which one can and should be held accountable for, involves the free and conscious 
adoption of a course that is against the rational order of the universe.
26
 
All sins, then, are violations of the order of the universe, and can be seen as 
contra rationem and contra Deum. The effects of these sins vary, however, based upon 
the severity of the sin: “venial” sins, according to Pieper, are sins that are “forgivable,”
27
 
and differ from the more severe “mortal” sins “in the same way the perfect form is 
distinguished from the imperfect.”
28
 While venial sins do cause a disturbance in the moral 
order, it is not on the same level as that of mortal sins; the latter is distinguished by the 
thoroughgoing nature of the corruption of the soul it occasions. “From within its own 
essence, from its inherent power to stand fast by its guilt, a healing is not possible—just 
as we call a disease ‘mortal’ if it can no longer be overcome from within the resources of 
the sick person, since the very principle of life has been jeopardized and affected by the 
                                                 
24
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fatal disease.”
29
 On this account, the heinous nature of a sinful act is not what causes it to 
be regarded as a “mortal” sin, but rather it is the refusal to acknowledge blame or guilt, to 
persevere contra rationem in the face of the rational order and the Divine Adjudicator. 
“Most crucially of all,” according to Pieper, sins (both mortal and venial) 
occasion “a still deeper ontological transformation, one that penetrates the very core of 
the person, branding the soul with a property which the ancients call…reatus.”
30
 He goes 
on to explain, “Sin doesn’t just mean: I have done something. Sin also means: I 
henceforth am something that I was not previously: I am, because of my deed, guilty.”
31
 
Herein lies the fundamental difference between a mere crime or ethical violation and sin: 
while the former is a violation of the norms of a given community, sin is understood to 
have an effect upon the very being of the individual. Sins cause warps and fractures 
precisely because they are violations of one’s very nature. Venial sins are less severe, 
bending but never breaking the self away from its inherent nature. Mortal sins, however, 
bring about irreparable harm, contorting one’s soul so violently that it can never be 
untwisted.
32
 While the action of a single sin is but a fleeting moment in life, each one is 
understood to have an effect upon the self as a whole, dragging it further and further from 
the goals and potentials that lead to full fulfillment and divine approbation. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that these corruptions of self are limited to the 
sinner and have no ultimate effect upon God, in spite of the fact of the sinner’s situation 
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in the natural order. In Aquinas’ cosmology, God stands removed from creation to the 
extent that human actions cannot affect the Godhead. “Viewed in strict terms, the action 
of man can neither provide anything for God nor take anything away from God… God’s 
intention cannot be frustrated [non frustratur], either in those who sin or in those who 
attain salvation.”
33
 God’s agency as divine creator and divine adjudicator cannot be 
marred by the activity of human agents precisely because they exist in virtue of God’s 
active intentionality. The corruption of the creature has no effect upon the creator, as the 
creator is constantly refashioning the creation to suit the rational order. Another way to 
look at this is to acknowledge that the intentionality of God is behind the sins of 
humanity. Aquinas asserts that “The cause of the removal of grace is not due only to the 
one who resists grace; it is also God who deigns not to bestow grace by virtue of his 
judging decree. Seen from this perspective, God is the cause of the blindness of the eye, 
the deafness of the ear, and the hardness of the heart.”
34
 In this sense, human beings seem 
to fall victim to a kind of entrapment, wherein God both sets up and convicts those guilty 
of sin seemingly without any agency on the part of the sinner. To go this far, however, is 
to forget the fundamental free agency of human beings, and to focus to much upon the 
ineffable will of God, drawing attention away from the question at hand (namely, what 
the practical consequences of sin really are).  
 
4. Summary 
 In this traditional framework, born from the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas and 
ensconced in the Roman Church and the vast majority of Western Christians for most of 
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the pre-modern and modern periods, sin is an act of a free human agent that violates, 
contradicts, or impedes the rational order of the universe. The divine telos that every 
creature of God is endowed with is understood to be the epitome of the Good: for as it 
states in Genesis 1:31, having created the whole universe and humankind, God sees that 
the creation is not just good, but “very good.” The perfection of the creation is the 
metaphysical frame into which the causes and effects of sin are set: the conscious 
violation of the rational order, the inhibition of the soul from its end, the corruption of 
self, and transcendent judgment of the Creator. 
 These defining characteristics of the traditional notion of sin, however, are 
precisely what lead to its dismissal by Enlightenment and Post-Modern philosophers. The 
view of the universe is seen as overly deterministic and seems plainly self-contradictory 
with the assertion of a divinely-oriented yet nonetheless free human will. The inward 
orientation of the effects of sin makes its practical value as a concept in ethics almost nil; 
ethics focuses on the effects of actions beyond the self, not within it. To craft moral and 
political policy without a standard of judgment that can be measured on the ground, 
within the context of a specific place and people, but that instead exists in a transcendent 
realm in which ‘it all comes out right in the end’ is to abandon the project of ethics to 
either fundamentalism or naïve utopianism. 
 What is wrong with this definition of sin, however, does not necessarily imply 
that the notion of sin is wholly outdated or unintelligible in the modern context. In the 
next section of the essay, I will present an explication of how the concept of sin came to 
be defined in the discourse of Latin American teología de la liberación [Theology of 
Liberation], the ways in which it appropriates some of the traditional Western Christian 
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notion of sin, but also the ways in which it improves upon this definition in providing a 
clearer standard for ethics and politics. 
 
B. Defining Sin in the Language of Liberation Theology 
 
1. Sin Is the Domination of the Other 
 The Theology of Liberation, broadly construed, encompasses a myriad of voices 
from across the Latin American world, yet no one figure is more closely identified with 
what Liberation theology is than Gustavo Gutierrez. In spite of the attempts to condemn 
or detract from the importance of his seminal work,
35
 Teología de la Liberación: 
Perspectivas (1972) is at the heart of the theological and philosophical movement of 
reinvention in the doxa and praxis of the Catholic Church. It is in Teología that sin is first 
clearly and distinctively defined for the discourse of Liberation theology: 
“Cristo nos ha liberado para que gocemos de libertad” (Galatians 5:1), nos dice 
Pablo. Liberación del pecado, en tanto que éste representa un repliegue egoísta 
sobre sí mismo. Pecar es, en efecto, negarse a amar a los demás y, por 
consiguiente, al Señor mismo. El pecado, ruptura de amistad con Dios y con los 
otros, es, para la Biblia, la causa última de la miseria, de la injusticia, de la 
opresión en que viven los hombres.
36
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The activity of sinning is described by Gutierrez as not just a failure to love one’s 
neighbor, to love the Other (los demás, los otros), but an active denial of the fellowship 
(amistad) and love (amar) that relates humans to one another and to God. Gutierrez 
couches his definition in biblical terms, noting that this specific definition of sin reflects 
the scriptural notion that it is sin that is the cause (material, formal, efficient and final) of 
injustice. Instead of beginning with the metaphysical conditions of rational order and free 
agency that Aquinas chooses as the basis for his doctrine of sin, Gutierrez chose to put 
his definition in purely ethical and relational terms; if there is any metaphysical principle 
at work here, it is that of amistad, which denotes the actuality of the relation of 
fellowship that binds up the agents at work in the world (God and humans). Conceiving 
the ordering of the world in terms of relations of fellowship and love affects the ways in 
which the metaphysical causes and effects of sin are understood: there is no doubt that 
free will plays a key role here as in Aquinas’ system, yet on this account will is always 
bound to ethical relations first and foremost, and not some standard of pure reason.
37
 The 
denial and ‘warping’ of the well-ordered creation we see in Aquinas thus explicitly 
becomes an ‘injustice,’ a ‘betrayal’ of the Other that generates conditions of misery and 
oppression; consequently, overlooking injustice for the sake of the “rational order” would 
in itself also be a betrayal and sin. 
 On the other hand, liberation from sin, the fundamental concern of Liberation 
Theology, is not just a negation of sin: Gutierrez, echoing the words of Lutheran 
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theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, asserts that “Pablo no solo afirma que Cristo nos liberó, 
que nos dice que lo hizo para que fuésemos libres. ¿Libres para qué? Libres para 
amar….La plenitud de la liberación—don gratuito de Cristo—es la comunión con Dios y 
con los demás.”
38
 Instead of speaking of liberation in terms of an exculpation or 
absolution, it ought to be thought of as an affirmation arising out of the negation of 
negation. Enrique Dussel calls this an “analectic,” as opposed to “dialectic,” moment: 
Negative dialectic is no longer enough. The analectical moment is the support of 
new unfoldings…The analectical moment is the affirmation of exteriority…to 
affirm exteriority is to realize what is impossible for the system…it is to realize 
the new, what has not been foreseen by the totality, that which arises from 
freedom that is unconditioned, revolutionary, innovative.
39
 
The negative theoretical moment in which the oppressive system is denied is not enough 
for liberation: in fact, the negation of this process itself (the total abandonment of the 
present way of thinking and being in relation to domination) is still not enough. Dussel 
explains that true liberation only comes through the lived, engaged praxis of a new ethic 
of community beyond the oppressive order of sinfulness.
40
 
 Since the act of liberation is not just negative but also positive (in that it brings 
about a new creation), one must think of sin as both an impediment to be overcome so as 
to move towards a more just future, and also (in its traditional sense) as a corruption of 
the self. What is impeded is the building up of amistad, fellowship, through love and in 
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community. Dussel explains in Ethics and Community that “The origin of evil or sin lies 
in a negation of the other, the other person, the other term of the person-to-person 
relationship.”
41
 The locus of the effects of sin is important to consider here: instead of 
focusing upon the corrupting influence of sin on the sinner, it is the Other, against whom 
the sinner commits his or her sin, who suffers the effects, whose existence is damaged. In 
this framework, the corruption of the sinner’s self through their evil act is secondary to 
the suffering of the victim, as well as the injury to the relation of fellowship. In a 
hierarchy of value, then, what emerges from this understanding of sin is that the life and 
soul of the other, as well as the person-person relation of love, are both more significant 
and damaging motivators for liberation than a simple corruption of the self. In point of 
fact, committing sin (i.e. denying the personhood of the other) reveals one’s self to 
oneself, but also reveals to the world the suffering self of the Other as well: in this sense 
it is “original” or “originary” sin. 
 Under the traditional definition of sin, however, the corruption of self receives its 
ethical warrant because of the relation of the created self in the reasonable order of God’s 
world. What is deficient in humankind comes about through a distancing or warping of 
what God makes and intends. So far the Creator’s relation to the notion of sin in 
Liberation Theology has seemed unclear: yet sin here too has to do with a distancing 
from God’s will and creation as well. Gutierrez writes that sin is a denial to love one’s 
neighbor, to love the other, and thus to deny to love the Lord himself. Dussel says 
explicitly that “Offence to God is always and antecedently an act of domination 
committed against one’s brother or sister. God is the absolute Other; hence God is 
offended when we dominate in some manner the other-and-neighbor. To dominate our 
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neighbor is to sin against God.”
42
 What is remarkable about this way of thinking of sin is 
not simply that the failure to love or the active domination of one’s neighbor is of vital 
importance in an ethical sense: it is the fact that all sin is understood to be a violation of 
the person-person relation of love first and foremost. Instead of couching sin in terms of 
the violation of Divine Reason and Order, it must be thought of in terms of the Divine 
Love and Fellowship which, unlike the unreachable standard of omniscience, humans 
have access to and experience of in their everyday existence. Dussel goes on to say, “Day 
be day, dominators take on personal, individual responsibility for their sin of domination. 
After all, they daily assert the privileges and the potential (the opportunities) accruing to 
them in virtue of this inherited sin [of wealth]. And never again will dominators be able 
to claim innocence of that of which they have the use and enjoyment.”
43
 There is no 
excuse for not recognizing one’s sin, on this account: there is no vast expanse between 
people and God to cloud one’s perception of the divine: those who commit a sin against 
their neighbor need only look into their victims’ face to recognize their guilt. In this way, 
the order that a sin violates is historical and mutable, not natural and deterministic.
44
 
 Dussel uses the language of “domination” to describe the perpetuation of a non-
loving, other-denying, person-to-non-person relation: “The praxis of domination is evil—
sin (Gk. Hamartia). It is praxis, but not of person vis-à-vis another as person.”
45
 
According to Gutierrez, this domination plays out on three interrelated levels: that of the 
economic, political, and theological. These three levels “se interpenetran recíprocamente 
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[penetrate one another reciprocally];”
46
 that is, they cannot be separated from one 
another. Dussel distinguishes two levels to sin, but relates them in a similar fashion: “In 
the concrete…sin is an economic, political, sexual, ideological, or similar, domination. In 
the abstract…all concrete domination, albeit profane, will always and at the same time be 
sin against God.”
47
 Whether speaking about the concrete versus abstract, or the socio-
economic versus theological, these two authors are both thinking of sin as an activity of 
human persons in time and on Earth that simultaneously has implications that go beyond 
(e.g. for the relation of divine fellowship). In both Dussel’ and Gutierrez’s systems, God 
is the Absolute Other who stands beyond the system, but not in an inaccessible, radically 
transcendent way: rather, sin contra Deum is understood as analectically included in any 
sense of sin in the concrete.
48
  Gutierrez says that one’s neighbor is “a visible reality 
[that] reveals to us and allows us to welcome the Lord,” but that cannot simply be treated 
as a means. It is in the active establishment of an agential relationship of friendship and 
love that God is revealed and that God’s presence in the world is revealed in the face of 
the Other.This is a striking departure from the traditional notion that God can remain 
unaffected by human sin, that God is neither diminished nor improved by human activity. 
In this framework, rather, the space between God and humanity is small, reduced down to 
the space between the oppressor and the oppressed, the dominator and the dominated, the 
sinner and the poor.  
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a. The Other and The Poor 
 Both Dussel and Gutierrez employ the language of ‘the Other’ borrowed from 
Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas when they describe the person affected by a sinful 
act, yet beyond the use of terms like ‘los demás,’ ‘los otros,’ or ‘el projímo,’ they go 
further in particularly naming these persons “los pobres,” the poor. For Gutierrez, this is 
a revealed truth contained in Christian Scripture: citing Deuteronomy 24:14-5 and 
Exodus 22: 21-3, he concludes that “Despreciar al prójimo…explotar al jornalero 
humilde y pobre, no pagar el salario a tiempo es offender a Dios…Inversamente, conocer, 
es decir amar, a Yahvé es hacer justicia al pobre y al humillado.”
49
 Gutierrez draws a 
clear connection between recognizing and establishing a relationship of love with the 
poor and the revelation of Lord God. On this account, the latter cannot happen without 
the former, thus binding the epistemological warrant for faith to the ethical treatment of 
the poor. “Encontramos al Señor en nuestros encuentros con los hombres, en particular 
los más pobres, marginados y explotados por otros hombres.”
50
 Dussel describes the 
“pobres y humillados” as those who live “exterior” to the system of wealth and privilege 
built up throughout the Modern period across the globe. In Philosophy of Liberation, he 
explains that the history of colonialism in Latin America must be understood as the 
product of a philosophical ideology that viewed all non-Europeans Others as non-human 
as well. “Being is the very foundation of the system, the totality of the sense of a culture, 
the macho world of the man of the center…Ontology, the thinking that expresses 
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Being…is the ideology of ideologies, the foundation of the ideologies of the empires, of 
the center.”
51
 This ideology of the center (both geopolitical and ontological) gives the 
warrant to treat those who live in the “periphery” of the system as non-persons, without 
the same recognition as those in the center. Dussel explains the political, historical and 
ideological formation of this system in Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism and 
Liberation Theology, writing that “The ‘pseudo-scientific’ division of history into 
Antiquity (as antecedent), the Medieval Age (preparatory epoch), and the Modern Age 
(Europe) is an ideological and deforming organization of history.” He goes on to say that 
“the centrality of Europe in the ‘world-system’ is not sole fruit of an internal superiority 
accumulated during the European Middle Age over against other cultures. Instead, it is 
also the effect of the simple fact of the discovery, conquest, colonization, and integration 
(subsumption) of Amerindia (fundamentally).”
52
 The totalizing system of the center 
reinforces itself through this ideology of exclusivity, even as it takes advantage of the 
material and intellectual resources borne out of interaction with peoples and lands of the 
periphery. There is no escaping the system as it is presently instantiated: “Every 
individual ineluctably, whether he wishes it or not, whether he knows it or not, is part of a 
class, either the dominators of the dominated. The domination of sin thus shapes the 
domination of some classes over others and furthers the tension between them.”
53
 Yet 
“beyond Being, transcending it, there is still reality. If reality is the order of the cosmic 
constitutions of things that are resistant, subsistent, ‘of themselves,’ it is evident that there 
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is reality beyond being…Among the real things that retain exteriority to Being, one is 
found that has a history, a biography, freedom: another person.”
54
 Dussel emphasizes that 
the people who reside beyond the purview of the system, those who fall into the class of 
the dominated, who live in suffering due to the neglect of their personhood by members 
of the center, are still very real. “Even in the extreme humiliation of prison, in the cold of 
the cell and the total pain of torture, even when the body is nothing but a quivering 
wound, a person can still cry: ‘I am another; I am a person; I have rights.’”
55
 These 
victims of the system are “the poor” in terms of the system: in terms of reality, from the 
perspective of the “cosmos,”
56
 of God, they are nonetheless human persons. 
In Ethics and Community, Dussel explicitly relates this notion of the poor living 
in exteriority to the Gospel message by saying, “The bible calls the potential, possible 
future community—the object of the service of the one who is ethically just—the 
‘crowd’…It indicates an indefinite number of poor who are not yet a ‘people’…These 
‘many,’ who are outside the laws of the system, who indeed live ‘in exteriority’ even 
with respect to social class, are the special object of the good, the holy, human being, the 
person who practices justice, goodness, holiness, [and] love of the other as other.”
57
 Just 
as Gutierrez describes the Christ’s revelation to humankind through the visible reality of 
the neighbor, Dussel asserts that the poor must be revealed as people to those within the 
system in order for the divine reconciliation of liberation to occur: “Forgiveness requires 
a clear, antecedent awareness of guilt on the part of the sinner…Without a real, objective, 
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shared, historical equality between the two persons—which means that the ‘rich’ can no 
longer be rich nor the ‘poor’ poor—there can be no reconciliation.”
58
 
Within the literature of the theology of liberation, the only way to achieve such a 
leveling is by adopting the ‘perspective of the poor’ as a fundamental methodological 
principle for ethics. In his article “Fundamental Moral Theory in the Theology of 
Liberation,” Francisco Rejón asserts that “Liberation ethics expressly identifies the locus 
from which it is developed, that is, its point of view, its situation, and even its 
interlocutor. In other words, it takes it contextual position explicitly. This is what is 
meant by the expression perspective of the poor. Reality is explicitly observed from the 
locus of the poor, and with the eyes of the poor.”
59
 Leonardo and Clodovis Boff further 
emphasize the necessity and authority of the self-revelation of the poor in Introducing 
Liberation Theology: “The oppressed are more than what social analysts—economists, 
sociologists, anthropologists—can tell us about them. We need to listen to the oppressed 
themselves. The poor, in their popular wisdom, in fact ‘know’ much more about poverty 
than does any economist. Or rather, they know in another way, in much greater depth.”
60
 
Liberation theology does not descend theoretically upon the world, principles in hand, but 
instead began as a critical response to the situation of the people of Latin America. Its 
origins are not highly formalized, but instead ring with a pragmatic sense of the reality 
and immediacy of experience: “No special discernment is needed to identify objective sin 
in the situation that the people of Latin America are living. It is all around us…Sin cannot 
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be studied abstractly; it is concretely present in subtle forms that require more careful 
theological analysis.”
61
 As we have already seen, sin is understood to be a fact of human 
existence in the Western Christian tradition: that this fact is the foundation upon which 
the entire critical analysis of Liberation Theology stands, however, and that this fact of 
experience is taken up in a way that is specifically geopolitically and socio-historically 
oriented is what makes this way of thinking unique within the tradition. 
From the lived experience of the poor, the depth of oppression is revealed as sin 
because sin goes beyond mere individual or systemic economic or political violence: its 
effects are existential as well, affecting the whole person of the victim. These various 
levels of the concrete manifestations of sin (economic, political, erotic, pedagogical) are 
blended together under the general category of the ‘rupture of divine fellowship,’ which 
is the essential element of a sinful act. These sinful acts exhibit what are very real effects 
of domination upon human beings: upon their bodies, upon their spirits, upon their 
communities. Yet when one takes a step back and reflects upon sin at the level of world, 
system, and universe, it is clear that the minutia of domination can also be thought of as 
Absolute Sin against the Absolute Other (God). Reconciliation with God and one’s 
fellow human, then, comes only as a total liberating response to this type of oppression. 
 
b. The “Coloniality of Being” as the Sin of the World 
 For Liberation Theologians, sin must be thought of in the concrete, lived 
experience of its victims in Latin America: this is the beginning of the salvific process of 
liberation. One way in which this becomes clear (as has already been shown) is through 
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the historicization of sin, and the identification of sin with the lived praxis of domination. 
Along with Dussel and Gutierrez, other Latin American thinkers have tried to articulate a 
historical analysis of this praxis at work in their land, in order to show that the systemic 
oppression wrought upon the people of Latin America is neither natural (and therefore a 
part of God’s rational Creation) nor just. The concept of the “coloniality of Being,” 
articulated by Walter Mignolo in the early 2000s as a development of Dussel’s 
historicization of non-personhood, describes how the praxis of domination at work in the 
conquest of the Americas reciprocally came to inform an understanding and justification 
for oppression, masking what would become the “sin of the world” in Latin America and 
the rest of the Global South under the system of global capitalism. 
 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, in his article “On the Coloniality of Being,” breaks 
down the concept into its constitutive parts by explaining that “Coloniality…refers to 
long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define 
culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict 
limits of colonial administration.”
62
 In the wake of the conquest of Latin America by 
Iberian conquistadores (as well as the implementation of colonial administrations in other 
parts of the world like India and Africa), a system of power developed that has effects 
beyond simple economic or political control. The first result of colonialism (the 
“discovery” of the Americas), in fact, was a philosophical analysis of the 
“anthropological colonial difference between the ego conquistador [the “I who 
conquers”] and the ego conquistado [the “I who is conquered]. The very relationship 
between colonizer and colonized provided a new model to understand the relationship 
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between the soul or mind and the body.”
63
 Maldonado-Torres asserts a view he shares 
with Dussel, Mignolo, Anibal Quijano and many other Latin American thinkers that the 
beginning of modern philosophy, with its skepticism of the nominalist-realist debate and 
its emphasis upon science, is rooted in the assertion of power through conquest and the 
subsequent dehumanization of the conquered people of Latin America. That there were 
two distinct kinds of person (the conqueror and the conquered, the self and the other, the 
rich and the poor) came to pervade modern systems of power, but more than that, it came 
to redefine persons at the ontological level. 
 This is where the “sin of the world” becomes manifest: on this account, the 
“coloniality of Being” is a corruption of the conquered person’s originary self: i.e., a fully 
human person, a freely-willing agent, created in the imago Dei. It is a mortal sin that 
locates its enduring effects in the body of its victims: their entire being is corrupted, and 
they stand reatus [condemned] before the system. The historical process of 
colonialization in Latin America is a structural and systemic sin committed against the 
colonized, who are torn from the created order and made to suffer.
64
 This sin can be seen 
clearly manifested in the forms of racism
65
 and classism that underlay the colonial 
economic system in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, and the global capitalist system in the 20
th
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century.
66
 The historical and existential effects of this system come to define the divides 
among people and the limits of ethical behavior; by labeling them with the category of 
sin, however, those limits are exposed in contrast to the absolute ethics of Amistad and 
community. 
 
2. Structures of Sin 
 The fundamental thesis echoed throughout liberation theology is that “The death 
of the poor is the death of God, the ongoing crucifixion of the Son of God. Sin is the 
negation of God; the negation of sin moves, sometimes in unknown ways, toward the 
affirmation of God, toward the presence of God as the giver of life.”
67
 This claim comes 
out of an interpretation of St. Paul’s epistles, as evidenced in the scriptural citations 
Gutierrez includes along with his definition of sin. Beyond the strain of Pauline thought 
wherein sin is a rupture of divine fellowship, the idea of sin in Liberation Theology is 
also linked strongly to Paul’s commentaries on what he calls “the Law.” While the 
former notion of sin as a rupture of divine Amistad tends towards a consideration of 
interpersonal relations in community, connection sinfulness to “the Law” cashes out in 
Liberation Theology as an analysis of economic and political elements that operate above 
the level of the individual. This is not to say that sin is ever divorced from the individual: 
on the contrary, that sins are acts of individual human agents is vital the historicity of the 
concepts of domination and liberation. In keeping with the tradition, sin is seen as a 
negative act, but that nonetheless is always also a positive assertion of some individual 
human will or agency. According to Dussel, individuals who sin through acts of 
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domination are “condemned (second death) to eternal death, deserved by reason of their 
responsibility (also personal and individual) exercised in the murder of the poor.”
68
 Yet 
as Jon Sobrino explains, “Structures manifest and actualize the power of sin, thereby 
causing sin, by making it exceedingly difficult for men and women to lead the life that is 
rightfully theirs as the daughters and sons of God. This sinful power is utterly real.”
69
 
Some view these two claims (holding every dominating sinner accountable for their sin 
vs. faulting structures of oppression) as in tension or even contradiction with one another, 
it is clear from the writing of Dussel that they actually are inseparable facts of 
experience: “True enough, speaking abstractly one can say that John, the individual, has 
sinned. But concretely John is Mary’s father and Martha’s spouse, Peter’s sibling, his 
pupils’ teacher, a citizen of his country, and so on. His is never—not even before God—
solitary and alone: in the concrete, he is never this solitary individual. Likewise, his fault 
or sin is never solitary in the concrete.”
70
 Dussel’s assertion that “no man is an island” 
shows the methodological moment in which liberation theology must (as an appropriate 
response to the concrete situation of the individual) move into the more theoretically 
transcendent realm of political, social and economic structures. Coming to know the ways 
in which these structures manifest sin is the primary goal of the historical-critical analysis 
of the liberation theologian. 
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 Franz Hinkelammert’s The Ideological Weapons of Death is one of the best 
examples of this type of analysis.
71
 Drawing upon the Pauline juxtaposition of life and 
death found most prominently in the Epistle to the Romans, Hinkelammert asserts that 
“Sin brought death and is oriented toward death. The law is the negation of sin, which for 
its part reproduces and reinforces sin and therefore also leads to death. Sin and law 
belong together, both mutually excluding and mutually reinforcing one another.”
72
 While 
intuitively one might think that systems of law and social organization that are intended 
to combat sin would always be beneficial, Hinkelammert observes that in fact this kind of 
negation of sin only compounds the dominating power of sin by heaping oppression upon 
oppression. “The more the law tries to expel sin, the more power sin has. In this 
connection Paul treats sin as a subject dwelling within the human subject…Sin acts on its 
own and takes over a person’s body.”
73
 This abdication of subjectivity on the one hand 
appears to absolve the individual person of any responsibility for their acts of domination. 
In point of fact, however, the negation of one’s own agency is in itself the beginning of 
the act of sin: the acceptance of an oppressive system is itself a rejection of the person-
person nature of truly ethical human praxis. 
 Economic and political structures can be judged then by the degree to which they 
either 1) impede human subjectivity, or 2) break down the divine fellowship of the 
person-person relation. Often, however, these systems are well-entrenched in human 
communities: Dussel describes this phenomenon through what he calls the “Babylon 
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Principle,” which describes a system as “closed in upon itself. It has replaced the 
universal human project with its own particular historical project. Its laws become 
natural, its virtues perfect, and the blood of those who offer any resistance—the blood of 
the prophets and heroes—is spilled by the system as if it were the blood of the wicked, 
the totally subversive.”
74
 Structural oppression of this type leads to the “ongoing 
crucifixion of the Son of God,” which is a continuous violence perpetrated without 
recourse to a moral standard extant within the system to end it. “Any system of 
prevailing, dominant practices…determines its established practices to be 
good…Domination and sin have been transformed into the very foundation of reality. 
Perverse praxis is now goodness and justice.”
75
 The “perverse justice” of a dominating 
social structure is precisely what Paul was referring to in his critique of ‘the Law,’ and 
why his letters exhorted his followers to place their faith beyond the present system, 
beyond the present world in the risen Christ, in whom all people are joined in one body as 
one human family.
76
 
 Dussel’s insistence upon the point that structures of oppression can become 
invisible recalls Milgrom’s interpretation of the Levitical תאמח, in which a person violates 
covenantal purity laws in an unintentional way. In both cases, it is not the intention of the 
person who commits the sin to knowingly violate a transcendental ethical principle: yet 
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intention ultimately does not determine culpability, nor does it lessen the effect of the sin 
upon the victim. Dussel is claiming here that one could be willing ends within an 
oppressive system that appear virtuous and noble (in the terms of the system), but that 
nonetheless bring harm upon the poor, and that this is just as much a sin as those who 
willfully wrong their neighbor. This is also what Hinkelammert means when he states 
that “sin” asserts its own agency within a person (though in this case, Hinkelammert has 
collapsed intention into agency in a way that Dussel does not). Finally, José Faus adds 
that while “sin is masked from human beings (or rather it is human beings who mask it 
from themselves) to the point where the sense of guilt becomes anasthetized…Jesus 
comes to unmask this sin.”
77
 The biblical hermeneutic of Liberation Theology is thus 
oriented towards bringing out sin in both its willed and unintentional (or at least 
unrecognized) forms, just as the socio-critical methodology of Liberation Theology seeks 
to reveal the sinfulness of the systems in which the poor live in domination. This 
fundamental concept of the “sin of the world”
78
 is the lens through which liberation 
theologians came to recognize the levels of oppression that dominate the poor and cause 
the kind of suffering and corruption of the spirit of divine fellowship that keeps the world 
in darkness. 
 
a. Three Levels of Oppression: Political, Economic, and Theological 
 Part of the unique critical stance of Liberation Theologians and Philosophers of 
Liberation is their multivalent approach that refuses to understand the dynamics of 
oppression and revolution in terms of a single process of history. For example, Enrique 
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Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation describes five different levels of liberation: political, 
economic, pedagogical, erotic, scientific, and semiotic.
79
 Gutierrez names three “niveles 
de significación [levels of signification]” of the notion of liberation: “liberación política, 
liberación del hombre a lo largo de la historia, liberacíon del pecado y entrada en 
comunión con Dios [political liberation, liberation of the human in the course of history, 
(and) liberation from sin and the entrance into communion with God].” He describes 
these three levels as “[condicionandose] mutuamente, pero no se confunden; no se dan el 
uno sin el otro, pero son distintos: forman parte de un proceso salvífico único y global, 
pero se sitúan en profundidades diferentes.”
80
 Gutierrez’s three levels of liberation 
(political, historical, and theological [the level of redemption from sin]) are merely levels 
of meaning describing what he calls a single process of liberation that occurs both at the 
level of the individual and the world. Taking a cue from Gutierrez’s subtitle to Teología 
de la Liberación, it is perhaps more accurate to think of these different levels as different 
“perspectives” from which the process of human history can be examined. Instead of 
thinking through history from one singular perspective, such as a pure Marxist analysis of 
economy, or a Hegelian analysis in terms of the development and movement of Geist, or 
even a traditional theological analysis that would view human history purely in terms of 
its relation to the divine order as it is expressed in scripture, Liberation theology strives to 
give an inclusive analysis that can give a complete picture of the forces of life and death 
at odds with one another in the historical process of liberation. 
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 Gutierrez justifies this multivalent approach partly in terms of a critique of the 
Euro-American view of “desarollo [development]” in the so-called “third world” of Latin 
America. The terms “development” and “dependence” both came into vogue in the 1950s 
and 60s to describe the relation of the hegemonic global North with Latin America and 
other countries at the periphery of the world system, and were integrated into the mission 
of the Catholic Church through their prominence in such documents as Pacem in Terris 
(1963), Gaudium et Spes (1965), and Populorum Progressio (1967). Gutierrez 
recognized, however, that the notions of development and dependence could lead either 
to “vislumbrar la necesidad de sacudirse de esa dependencia, de liberarse de ella…o se la 
reduzca a un horizonte puramente económico y social.”
81
 One of the central theses of 
Gutierrez’s text is that theologians cannot simply dodge the question of economic and 
social dependence and oppression by claiming that they have nothing to say of the matter: 
in fact, the analysis at the level of the global system, and then at the level of humanity’s 
relation to God both take the notion of development and not only humanize it, but even 
make it holy and divine. Dussel writes that “To assert that the poverty of the poor (which 
means their death) stems naturally from the will of God, or to pretend to a reconciliation 
that would take place without an antecedent hatred of the world and praxis of justice, are 
propositions of a theology of domination.”
82
 The oppression suffered by the poor, when 
illuminated by a thoroughgoing political, historical, economic and theological critique, 
ceases to be a merely theoretical reality expressed in statistics or the vast spans of the 
cycles of history. Instead, the suffering of the poor is recognized for what it is: the sin of 
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the world, a complete and total corruption of self and victim at the level of the individual 
and society, a wrong that can and should be rectified through a process that liberates the 
poor from the suffering of the system. 
 
3. Liberation from Sin 
“The God who pitied the downtrodden and the Christ who came to set 
prisoners free proclaim themselves with a new face and in a new image 
today. The eternal salvation they offer is mediated by the historical 
liberations that dignify the children of God and render credible the coming 
utopia of freedom, justice, love, and peace, the kingdom of God in the midst 
of humankind.”
83
 
 
“Liberation” is a historically and geopolitically situated response to the sin 
of the world, that is, to the structural forces of oppression and the individuals who 
instantiate this domination in the lives of their neighbors. It is the expiation of sin 
through the power of the Gospel, the call to divine fellowship that not only accepts 
the Other, but unites self and Other in Amistad. Through the process of liberation, 
what comes about is not merely a revolt against the system that brings down death 
upon the heads of the poor, but the creation of something new: “The new Earth is 
not anticipated individually but in community with all humankind. The center of 
this anticipation, according to Paul, is love for neighbor, which is the nucleus of 
ethics and the decisive point for working out morality.”
84
 As Gutierrez stated in his 
definition of sin and liberation, freedom from sin (liberation) enables humans to be 
free to live in fellowship with one another, that is, in community with one another. 
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This orientation towards community is where Dussel sees the great moral 
strength of the Theology of Liberation. This can be seen in his description of the 
“Jerusalem Principle,” which he juxtaposes to the “Babylon Principle”: “The hope 
of the new Jerusalem is the ‘Jerusalem principle.’ It is a utopian Christianity that 
believes in the reign of God, hates the Prince of ‘this world’ and his reign, and 
inaugurates a praxis of liberation where all will receive ‘on the basis of each one’s 
need.’ But in order for Jerusalem to exist, obviously Babylon must be destroyed, 
and the poor, the heroes, the saints, and the martyrs rejoice at its fall.”
85
 The 
liberated community, the first fruit of liberation, is characterized by three factors: 
1) the destruction of the prevailing order; 2) utopianism (relative to the current 
world system); and 3) a praxis (ethical practice) that recognizes the Other as 
brother/sister in Christ. Utopia, generally taken as an ethereal concept useful for 
metaphysical and ethical theorization, is in the case of Liberation Theology viewed 
as something that is not only of this world, but is actively manifested in the process 
of liberation. Dussel and Hinkelammert explain this best through their readings of 
Paul: “Saint Paul spoke of ‘madness’ (1 Cor. 1:18-2:16): that which is absurd for 
the prevailing morality. For the dominant, present rationality, which dictates the 
true and the false…the construction of the new Jerusalem is the absolute evil 
(because it calls in question the current system in its totality).”
86
 Gutierrez similarly 
talks about the utopian Reign of God as “[surgendo] con renovada energía en 
moments de transición y de crisis, cuanda la etapa en que se halla la ciencia llega a 
límites en su explicación de la realidad social, y cuando se abren nuevas sendas a la 
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praxis historica. La utopía, así comprendida, no es ni opuesta ni exterior a la 
ciencia.”
87
 The utopianism that characterizes the praxis of liberation is an engaged, 
critical utopianism, one that is emergent in history, rather than transcendent.  
Liberation is a calculated response to the sin of the world: Gutierrez calls it a 
“denuncia y anuncio [denunciation and anunciation]” that “se pueden realizar en la 
praxis….Si la utopía no lleva a una acción en el presente, es una evasión de la 
realidad.”
88
 The instantiation of this utopian “Kingdom of God” is the necessary 
rebellion against the pervasive sin of the world: “The Kingdom of God can never 
be identified with the prevailing system. Any passive acceptance of the powers that 
be, of the order of oppression, is a denial of the Kingdom.”
89
 
At the same time, liberation is also characterized in Christological terms in 
the Theology of Liberation. More often than not, the Exodus is pointed to as a 
scriptural example of this revolutionary overthrowing of the prevailing system of 
slavery and death and the establishment of a free people: however, Gutierrez also 
points out that “La obra de Cristo se inscribirá en este movimiento, llevándolo a su 
pleno complimiento….[porque] La obra de Cristo es una nueva creación… Más 
todavía, es en esta ‘nueva creación’, es decir, en la salvación que aporta Cristo, 
                                                 
87
 Gutierrez, Teología, 313. “[The Reign of God] surges up with renewed energy in moments of transition 
and crisis, when the age in which  the current science arrives at limits in its explication of social reality, and 
when new paths open themselves to historical praxis. Utopia, understood in this way, is neither opposed nor 
exterior to science.” 
 
88
 Ibid, 312. 
 
89
 Dussel, Beyond Philosophy, 93. 
 
 41
donde la creación adquiere su pleno sentido.”
90
 The Exodus is a historical moment 
of liberation: in Christ, however, all of history, all of creation comes into a state of 
liberation. The epitome of God’s creation, made manifest in Christ, is the unity of 
the human community: “All human bodies—joined in unity—make up the body of 
Christ. According to Paul, Christ lives in the bodily life of human beings…which is 
where God’s love dwells.”
91
  
Beyond its orientation towards the utopian, meta-systemic Reign of God, 
however, the process of liberation is built upon a praxis and epistemology of faith. 
“The theology of liberation understands itself as a reflection from faith on the 
historical reality and action of the people of God, who follow the work of Jesus in 
announcing and fulfilling the Kingdom. It understands itself as an action by the 
people of God in following the work of Jesus and, as Jesus did, it tries to establish 
a living connection between the world of God and the human world.”
92
 The work 
of the Liberation Theologian is a part of the process of liberation, in that, through 
the perspective of poor, theologians give voice to the Gospel of liberation revealed 
in the being of Christ and already present on the periphery of the world system. 
Hinkelammert writes that “In the world of grace and life [kingdom of God], Paul 
does not know sin: sin in fact means leaving that world.”
93
 An epistemology of 
“faith” in this sense does not mean a belief in what is not real, but in what exists 
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beyond the world system; in this sense it is transcendent. Yet at the same time the 
object of this belief, the Kingdom of God and liberation from oppression, is 
completely of this world: “Faith…leads to a subject constituted on the basis of the 
coming unity among human beings. Subjectivity comes about on the basis of love 
for neighbor, and so its starting point is life.”
94
 This epistemological orientation 
towards what is beyond the present system is the essential character of a libratory 
interpretation of the Gospel in the context of history: “The gospel abides as the 
fundamental horizon, the ultimate ethical reference, of all Christian praxis, that of 
the social magisterium of the church as well as that of the ethical conscience of the 
saints and prophets. In reality the only infallible, absolute, really Christian, ‘once 
and for all’ (hapax) ‘social teaching’ is the gospel.”
95
 Faith, hope, and love orient 
the process of liberation, both as principles of praxis and necessarily as 
epistemological mandates for hermeneutics and critical analysis of the world’s 
structures of oppression and domination. Yet Dussel also states that “Faith does not 
save, nor hope, nor the currency of the promise, unless these be accompanied by an 
ethical praxis (no longer a moral praxis, such as has prevailed in the past, under a 
regime of domination) of effective service to the poor in the construction of the 
new order.”
96
 Activity in service to the poor and in service to what is beyond the 
present morality of the system that dominates them should always ground the faith 
and hope for liberation in human life. 
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This process of liberation from sin, like the occurrence of sin itself, is thus 
always situated in history. Gutierrez writes that “Es en el templo donde 
encontramos a Dios. Pero se trata de un templo de piedras vivas, de hombres 
estrechamente relacionados entre ellos, que hacen juntos la historia y se forjan a sí 
mismos….El templo de Dios es la historia humana, lo ‘sagrado’ sale de los 
estrechos límites de los lugares de culto.”
97
 The divisions between sacred and 
profane, socio-political and religious are broken down in the process of liberation, 
because liberation encompasses the entirety of human experience. The totality of 
creation is reflected in the face of God: in Christ, the Word incarnated, that totality 
is humanized, and the whole of human life takes on the significance of divine 
approbation and redemption. This is what makes the oppression of this world sin: it 
is what makes the liberation of the poor and the establishment of a just and loving 
community a divine salvation from sin. 
 
a. Regnum Dei [The Reign of God] 
 The concept of the “Reign of God” is at the center of the liberation process: it is 
the telos towards which liberation tends, yet it is also already manifested in human 
history and experience. This paradoxical notion arises out of a scriptural inconsistency 
that often troubles theologians: “The kingdom is not just in the future, for it is ‘in our 
midst’ (Luke 17:21); it is not a kingdom ‘of this world’ (John 18:36), but it nevertheless 
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begins to come about in this world.”
98
 As has been shown, however, thinkers of 
Liberation Theology take these competing passages to point to the utopian character of 
what might be called the “state of liberation” anticipated and worked towards within the 
world system. It is both a concept by which the “historical wickedness of the world, and 
thereby the reign of sin” is exposed, which is why it is “the most adequate reality for 
expressing liberation,”
99
  its antithesis. Yet Dussel explains that this principle asserts 
itself in human life and praxis as well:  
The reign of God is total fulfillment. Some are poor now, but “the reign of God is 
theirs” (Matt. 5:3)…In confrontation with present negatives, the reign of God is 
present as the full realization of the human being as absolute, irreversible, 
undiminished positivity…True, the reign develops mysteriously in every man and 
woman of good will; but it must not be forgotten that the privileged place of its 
presence is the community…The community itself, community life itself, was 
already the reality of the reign: merely under way, inaugurated, still in the pangs 
of birth, it is true—but reality.
100
 
Dussel does not state that the Kingdom of God is not just some future telos that is 
unrecognizable in this world, but is actively present whenever the “absolute, irreversible, 
undiminished positivity” of the individual is expressed in human life. According to 
Dussel, this occurs first and foremost in community, that is, in relationships of self and 
Other. In such a community, where two and three are gathered in common fellowship and 
history and purpose, the Reign of God is present (cf. Matthew 18:20). Dussel tempers his 
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claims with the recognition that God’s Kingdom is “still in the pangs of birth,” claiming 
that “Where there is sin (and the absolute non-existence of sin would entail its necessary 
non-existence, and thus an actually realized, post-historical reign of heaven), there must 
always be dominated, or poor.” but asserts that, through the praxis of liberation, it will 
indeed grow. “The radical principle of Christian ethics in general and of liberation and 
community ethics (which is the central aspect of basic theology) in particular…is the 
face-to-face of the person-to-person relationship in the concrete, real, satisfied, happy, 
community in the gladness of being one with God.”
101
 From this recognition, Dussel 
asserts what he calls “the Absolute Principle of Ethics”: “Liberate the Poor.” 
The principle “Liberate the poor” implies: (1) a totality, a prevailing moral 
system; (2) an oppressor (sinner), the agent of the act of domination; (3) someone 
just (at least where the relationship of oppressor-oppressed is concerned) who is 
being treated unjustly. At the same time, “Liberate the poor” presupposes: (4) the 
importance of keeping account of mechanisms of sin; (5) the ethical duty of 
dismantling these mechanisms; (6) the necessity of constructing an escape route 
from the system; (7) the obligation to build the new system of justice.”
102
 
In this principle, Dussel sums up the practical aspects of Liberation Theology. He states 
that this principle is “absolute (not relative), and nevertheless concrete,”
103
 that the truths 
it expresses and the demands it makes are true and just in all places and at all times. Just 
as the Gospel is the fundamental ground of interpretation for Christian ethics, Dussel is 
claiming here that this principle is the best articulation of that message. In this sense, he 
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echoes the “option for the poor” which is central to Liberation Theology, as well as the 
analectic (as opposed to dialectic) relation of God and Christ to the poor of the world here 
and now.  
 
4. Summary 
 While the traditional definition of sin in Western Christianity focuses upon the 
corruption of the sinner’s soul and his/her relation to God through an act in violation to 
the order of creation, Liberation Theology proposes a notion of sin that identifies the 
locus of the corrupting effects of sin in the body and being of the Other (the poor), in the 
person-to-person relationship, thereby doing damage to the all-encompassing presence of 
the Divine in community. God does not stand beyond the creation in judgment, but bears 
the brunt of such domination in the person of Jesus Christ and in the ongoing violence of 
human history. Yet beyond his suffering, there is also hope in Christ for the liberation of 
the poor and the realization of their full subjectivity in the Kingdom of Heaven. Truly 
Christian ethics are oriented towards the transcendence of the present system of violence 
and domination (sin) through a praxis of liberation that recognizes the Other as a brother 
or sister in Christ. This teleogical orientation has much in common with the traditional 
notion of sin, since sin is an impediment to full realization of the self for the poor (though 
the sin is not their own). The ongoing struggle towards realizing this liberated state of 
being drives human history, sacralizing the geopolitical conflicts once viewed as issues 
unrelated to faithful Christianity. 
The Theology of Liberation is a critical undertaking of the singular and absolute 
ethical principle of liberating the poor, taking as its foundation the perspective of the poor 
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and the Gospel (evangelion) of Christ. This is a radical departure from the view of the 
sacerdotal expiation of sin through the Church for one’s own personal sake: moreover, it 
calls into question the very nature of what the Body of Christ truly is. Theology of 
Liberation sees the liberation of sin not just as a denial of the inherent oppression of 
human history, but as the positive building up of a faithful community, the Kingdom of 
God in our midst, a much more anthropocentric specification of the fruits of salvation 
than the one given alongside the traditional definition of sin (namely that the restoration 
of sin restores the individual’s soul and the integrity of the Creation). It is a critical 
response to the Latin American experience of the “coloniality of Being,” of oppression, 
suffering, hunger, and the death that pervade everyday experience: it is a Gospel for the 
colonized, the poor, the victims of the “sin of the world” whose only hope of salvation 
(that is, of life itself) is liberation. 
 In the following section, I will analyze two responses to the characterization of sin 
in Liberation Theology. The first comes out of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger’s (Pope Benedict XVI) 1984 “Instruction on Certain Aspects 
of the ‘Theology of Liberation’,” and Pope John Paul II’s 1979 address to the third 
Puebla council of Latin American Bishops. These two works represent the orthodox 
critique of the theology on doctrinal grounds. Second, I will reconsider the identity of the 
‘sinner’ and ‘the poor’ given in Liberation Theology’s concept of sin through a 
philosophical analysis and reading of Josiah Royce’s The Problem of Christianity, in 
which he discusses Pauline notions of community and reconciliation that stand at odds 
with certain problematic aspects of liberation theology. 
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CHAPTER III 
 TWO CRITICISMS OF THE CONCEPT OF SIN IN THE THEOLOGY OF 
LIBERATION 
 
A. Criticism from the Magisterium: Pope John Paul II’s Address to the Puebla 
Conference (1979) and Joseph Ratzinger’s “Instruction” (1984) 
“The Church is born of our response in faith to Christ. In fact, it is by sincere 
acceptance of the Good News that we believers gather together in Jesus' name in 
order to seek together the Kingdom, build it up and live it. The Church is ‘the 
assembly of those who in faith look to Jesus as the cause of salvation and the source 
of unity and peace.’”
104
 
  
 In Teología de la Liberacíon, Gutierrez states that the Catholic Church in Latin 
America had begun to shake off its former role as a part of the system of oppression at 
work in society, and that the practical expressions of the “option for the poor” already 
visible across the continent reflected the intellectual work of Liberation Theologians. Yet 
he also recognizes that the situation of the Latin American Church is unique within the 
larger Catholic Church. “La iglesia, hasta hoy estrechamente ligada al orden actual, 
comienza a situarse en forma diversa frente a la situación de despojo, opresión y 
alienación que se vive en América latina.”
105
 Latin American Liberation Theology as a 
movement within the Catholic Church came to prominence during the time of the second 
Vatican Council, yet as Gutierrez states, it cannot be seen as a having its origins in the 
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declared intentions of Vatican II to make the Church a “Church of the Poor.” According 
to Peter Hebblethwaite, a Jesuit priest who wrote on Vatican affairs for the National 
Catholic Reporter from the time of Vatican II through the 1990s, the Conference of Latin 
American Bishops (CELAM), first convoked in 1955, was divided from its founding 
between proponents of liberation theology and reactionary conservatives who decried the 
new movement of thought as doctrinally impure, atheistic, and Marxist.
106
 However, in 
the years following Vatican II in 1965 and the landmark council at Medellín in 1968, the 
“option for the poor” and the recognition of the pervasive injustices of the global 
economy began to gain prominence within the mainstream of Catholic Church policy. 
Pope Paul VI’s 1974 “Evangelii Nuntiandi” cautiously endorsed the option for the poor, 
but reinforced doctrinal limits on the interpretations of Liberation Theologians that the 
more conservative John Paul II would come to reinforce when he took his definitive stand 
on the topic five years later at the third meeting of the CELAM at Puebla.
107
  
 Pope John Paul II’s address to the conference at Puebla and the “Instruction on 
Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of Liberation’” composed at his request by Cardinal 
Joseph Ratzinger (then head of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith and 
now Pope Benedict XVI) in 1985 focus upon three primary areas of critique in their 
discussions of liberation theology: the “purity” of the doctrines of the Catholic faith, the 
emphasis upon praxis within and beyond the Church, and the conflation of the sacred and 
profane. All three sets of concerns originate in what appears to be a fundamental 
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misreading of the primary documents of Liberation Theology already examined in this 
study: however, as will become clear, the concerns of the Magisterium reflect the 
traditional ontological/metaphysical definition of sin viewed and imposed from the 
perspective of the center (the dominator). 
  
1. Doctrinal Purity 
 It is worth mentioning at the outset that these documents do not wholly condemn 
the concepts of Liberation Theology. On the contrary, Benedict XVI begins his 
“Instruction” by endorsing the fundamental definition of liberation as freedom “from the 
radical slavery of sin. Its end and its goal is the freedom of the children of God, which is 
the gift of grace.”
108
 Benedict XVI likewise picks up on the centrality of the notion of sin 
in his section on the “Biblical Foundations” of Liberation Theology, writing that “Christ, 
our Liberator, has freed us from sin and from slavery to the Law and to the flesh, which is 
the mark of the condition of sinful mankind…This means that the most radical form of 
slavery is slavery to sin. Other forms of slavery find their deepest root in slavery to 
sin…Freedom is a new life in love.”
109
 Benedict XVI clearly agrees that the pervasive 
nature of sin is a constraint upon human subjectivity, and that the power of liberation 
comes in the freedom it gives to live into a life of live and fellowship: “The 
commandment of fraternal love extended to all mankind thus provides the supreme rule 
of social life. There are no discriminations or limitations which can counter the 
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recognition of everyone as ‘neighbor’.”
110
 In these senses, the Theology of Liberation 
“designates a theological reflection centered on the biblical theme of liberation and 
freedom, and on the urgency of its practical realization”
111
 that is perfectly valid and in 
keeping with the mission of the Church. 
However, John Paul II’s pseudo-endorsement of the themes of Theology of 
Liberation in his address at Puebla reveals wherein the view of the Magisterium begins to 
diverge from that of the Liberation Theologians: “Let us also keep in mind that the 
Church’s action in earthly matters such as human advancement, development, justice, the 
rights of the individual, is always intended to be at the service of man; and of man as she 
sees him in the Christian vision of the anthropology that she adopts.”
112
 Throughout his 
address, John Paul II harps upon the need “To be watchful for purity of doctrine, the basis 
in building up the Christian community, [which] is therefore, together with the 
proclamation of the Gospel, the primary and irreplaceable duty of the Pastor, of the 
Teacher of the faith.”
113
 More specifically, the Pope asserts that it is in the areas of 
anthropology and the secularizing of history where Liberation Theology has gone most 
awry. “Thanks to the Gospel, the Church has the truth about man. This truth is found in 
an anthropology that the Church never ceases to fathom more thoroughly and to 
communicate to others. The primordial affirmation of this anthropology is that man is 
God’s image and cannot be reduced to a mere portion of nature or a nameless element in 
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the human city.”
114
 John Paul II’s reference to the anthropology that links human beings 
to God through creation harkens back to the ontology underlying the traditional doctrine 
of sin: humanity is understood first and foremost as a creature standing in relation to its 
creator. Over and against the secular humanism that pervaded the time, John Paul II 
asserts that the foundation for the entirety of the Gospel message and thereby the 
redeeming power of the Church is this conception of the person as inherently of value in 
relation to the creator. “In the light of this truth, man is not a being subjected to economic 
or political processes; these processes are instead directed to man and are subjected to 
him.”
115
 As the epitome of creation, humankind cannot be subject to inhuman systems 
(namely economic, political, or social exploitation or domination). If human beings are 
subject to inhuman systems, as the analysis of Liberation Theology seems to claim, then 
the glory of their Creator is thereby diminished. However, as has already been shown, 
human agency and culpability in systems of domination is central to the revolutionary 
character of Liberation theology: it is precisely this fact that drives the struggle within 
human history. Indeed, that human beings are culpable for the ills of the system is a 
binding up of the notion of sin in a way neglected by ways of thinking that see sin only in 
terms of free will. 
 In a similar vein, the completeness of sin and the subsequent totality of Christ’s 
saving power is another point of contention from the perspective of the Magisterium. 
According to Benedict XVI, the mistake of a hermeneutic of liberation is “not in bringing 
attention to a political dimension of the readings of Scripture, but in making this one 
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dimension the principal or exclusive component.”
116
 According to John Paul II, this error 
especially applies in the figure of Christ: “In some cases either Christ’s divinity is passed 
over in silence, or some people in fact fall into forms of interpretation at variance with 
the Church’s faith. Christ is said to be merely a ‘prophet’, one who proclaimed God’s 
Kingdom and love, but not the true Son of God, and therefore not the center and object of 
the very Gospel message.”
117
 The claim of reductionism in Liberation Theology, 
however, can be seen as patently false if one take note of either (a) the different levels of 
analysis and signification given in Liberation Theology, (b) the centrality of the notion of 
sin as the impetus for a total liberation, or (c) the unity of God and humanity through 
Christ’s advent, ministry, and atoning sacrifice in human history. The claims of 
reductionism made from within the Magisterium reflect a reading of Liberation Theology 
that neglects these three key features. 
 Perhaps the most vociferous criticisms of Benedict XVI’s “Instruction,” however, 
are aimed at what he calls “Concepts uncritically borrowed from Marxist ideology.”
118
 
The equation of Marxism with communism by Roman Catholic Church had, at this time, 
soured many church leaders who saw the totalitarian regimes of Russia, China, North 
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Korea and others as unjunst.
119
 In addition to these practical concerns, though, the 
Magisterium also took issue in theory with Marxist ideas. According to Benedict XVI 
(and drawing upon the commentary of Pope Paul VI), Marxism is a system of thought 
that presupposes ideological and deterministic structures of class (§ VII.6), tends towards 
totalitarianism (§ VII.7), denies the liberty and rights of human persons, whose 
subjectivity is co-opted by the forces of class and history (§ VII.8-9), denies the existence 
of the human soul (§ VII.10), and generally undermines Christian anthropology, thereby 
undermining the notions of sin and salvation. Furthermore, Gutierrez’s claim of the 
inherent conflict in the historical moment of Latin America and the theoretically 
permanent presence of class  struggle under this Marxist view of history is seen by 
Benedict XVI as antithetical to the Church’s gospel of reconciliation and peace through 
Christ: “Class struggle thus understood divides the Church herself, and that in light of 
this struggle even ecclesial realities must be judged.”
120
  In this way it seems that all 
analysis that shares elements with Marxism is, in the eyes of the Magisterium, “fruit of 
the poisoned tree.” This, however, is a gross oversimplification of the application of 
Marxist tendencies in the Theology of Liberation: to condemn the entire process of 
analysis of economic and political injustice simply because it has Marxist proclivities is 
intellectually unwarranted. Furthermore, the fact that the hegemonic structure of the 
Church may be subject to critique could be a motivating factor behind this line of 
criticism. This is precisely the point that John Paul II and Benedict XVI come to defend 
in addressing the role of the Magisterium. 
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2. The Power and Place of the Magisterium 
“You are teachers of the Truth, and you are expected to proclaim 
unceasingly, but with special vigor at this moment, the truth concerning the 
mission of the Church, object of the Creed that we profess, and an 
indispensable and fundamental area for our fidelity.”
121
 
 
 The fact that the CELAM was so thoroughly infiltrated by the Theology of 
Liberation caused a great deal of worry in Rome, so much so that many of the leaders of 
the Liberation Theology movement were openly rebuked by the Vatican for their so-
called ‘false teachings.’
122
 John Paul II’s emphasis upon doctrinal purity relates directly 
to his idea that “We are born of the Church. She communicates to us the riches of life and 
grace entrusted to her. She generates us by baptism, feeds us with the sacraments and the 
word of God, prepares us for mission, leads us to God's plan, the reason for our existence 
as Christians.”
123
 The Pope saw the theology of Liberation, at the level of content, as a 
betrayal of the traditional interpretations of the Christian Gospel (as was seen in the 
previous section): yet at a more practical level, he also saw the dangerous implications 
for the power of the Church emerging in the praxis of Liberation: “In some cases an 
attitude of mistrust is produced with regard to the “institutional” or “official” Church, 
which is considered as alienating, as opposed to another Church of the people, one 
“springing from the people” and taking concrete form in the poor… if the Gospel that we 
proclaim is seen to be rent by doctrinal disputes…how can those to whom we address our 
preaching fail to be disturbed, disoriented, even scandalized?”
124
 On the one hand, John 
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Paul II is rightly worried about doctrinal schism over the differing emphases of the 
practitioners of Liberation Theology; on the other hand, his view displays a thundering 
deafness to the criticisms of Eurocentricity embedded in Latin American theologians’ 
work. That the Holy See could be considered part of the hegemony of the world system is 
utterly incomprehensible to the Pope, who, in spite of the redefinition and rededication of 
the Church to serve the needs of the poor at Vatican II (implying that it had not been 
adequately fulfilling this duty), affirms the infallibility of the tradition over and against 
the transmodern critique of Liberation thinkers. Benedict XVI likewise points out that 
“The partisan conception of truth [in Liberation Theology]…corroborates this position. 
Theologians who do not share the theses of the ‘theology of liberation’, the hierarchy, 
and especially the Roman Magisterium are thus discredited in advance as belonging to 
the class of oppressors. Their theology is a theology of class.”
125
 Here, Benedict is 
critiquing the logical conclusion of the preferential “option for the poor” in Liberation 
Theology. Again, however, he seems quick to accuse Liberation thinkers of exclusivity 
without necessarily pausing to question whether or not the criticism from the periphery is 
accurate. 
 John Paul II goes on to say, “At the level of content, one must see what is their 
fidelity to the word of God, to the Church's living Tradition and to her Magisterium.”
126
 
The system of verification John Paul II would have the Church’s leaders utilize appeals 
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first to doctrine, then to the authority of the offices of the Vatican, then to the councils of 
bishops, and so on down the line, finally arriving at the lived experience of the people; 
this uncritical approach is precisely what Liberation Theology reverses in its ground-up 
analysis of sin and reconciliation. In his “Instruction,” Benedict XVI walks back a bit 
from the heavy-handed claim of John Paul II, writing that “One of the conditions for 
necessary theological correction is giving proper value to the ‘social meaning of the 
Church’. This teaching is by no means closed…In this perspective, the contributions of 
theologians and other thinkers in all parts of the world to the reflection of Church is 
indispensable today.”
127
 However, he also cautions that “pastors must look after the 
quality and content of catechesis and formation which should always present the ‘whole 
message of salvation’ and the imperatives of true liberation within the framework of this 
whole message.”
128
 Once again, the centrality of doctrinal catechesis is emphasized, one 
that is in keeping with what Benedict XVI calls “the whole message of salvation” 
(namely the Gospel of the Catholic Church).  
 
3. Orthodoxy vs. Orthopraxy: “First the Bread, then the Word” 
 In his view of Liberation Theology, Benedict XVI sees the subsumption of “the 
whole message of salvation” to the historical processes of liberation (economic, political, 
pedagogical, etc.) as a radical “secularization of the Kingdom of God”
129
 and a 
relativization of the “truth” of the Church to the interests of classes. As was seen in the 
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previous section, that the Magisterium could be associated with the class of oppressors 
was a central point of critique of Theology of Liberation and source of queasiness for 
both John Paul II and Benedict XVI. Beyond personal or political motivations, however, 
the critique rests on the distinction between “orthodoxy” and the “orthopraxy” 
emphasized in libratory analysis: 
‘orthodoxy’ or the right rule of faith, is substituted by the notion of “orthopraxy” 
as the criterion of the truth. In this connection it is important not to confuse 
practical orientation…with the recognized and privileged priority given to a 
certain type of “praxis.” For them, this praxis is the revolutionary “praxis” which 
thus becomes the supreme criterion for theological truth. A healthy theological 
method no doubt will always take the “praxis” of the Church into account and will 
find there one of its foundations, but that is because that praxis comes from the 
faith and is a lived expression of it.
130
 
Such participation in a ‘classist,’ ‘revolutionary’ praxis is not only dangerous for the 
Church: it is counter to the mission of the church as expressed by John Paul II in his 
address at Puebla. He asserts that “Evangelization in the present and future of Latin 
America cannot cease to affirm the Church’s faith: Jesus Christ, the Word and the Son of 
God, becomes man in order to come close to man and to offer him, through the power of 
his mystery, salvation, the great gift of God.”
131
 The Gospel of Christ (as it is professed 
by the Church) eschews disunity in favor of unity; it affirms a mysterious and personal 
salvation; it is oriented towards the glorification of God through the restoration of 
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Creation. The Pope’s tone in this section of the address is vehement: the revolutionary 
character of liberation, with its talk of overthrowing systems and the struggle that 
characterizes history as a manifestation of the Gospel, is at odds with the theology of a 
God whose omnipotence and mercy (expressed in the mystery of Christ) are the hope and 
assurance for the salvation of every person. He concludes, “From this faith in Christ, 
from the bosom of the Church, we are able to serve men and women, our peoples, and to 
penetrate their culture with the Gospel, to transform hearts, and to make systems and 
structures more human.”
132
 The vision of John Paul II for the church is to infuse the 
culture of Latin America with the hope of the Gospel, but in a way that addresses the 
individual (“transforming hearts”). What exactly he means by “make systems and 
structures more human,” however, is unclear: given the critique of Liberation Theology 
for putting too much stock in so-called “impersonal structures” and the reality that 
systems of domination are carried out and expressed in the lives of human persons, this 
comment in particular calls into question whether or not the Pope affirms the necessity 
for structural overhaul (i.e. revolution). On the other hand, Gutierrez affirms that “En 
América Latina, la iglesia debe situarse en un continente en proceso revolucionario, en 
donde la violencia está presente de diferentes maneras. Su misión práctica y teóricamente, 
pastoral y teológicamente se define frente  a él. Es decir, más por el hecho político 
contextual que por problemas intraclesiásticos.”
133
 For Gutierrez, the whole mission of 
the Church in Latin America is oriented towards the revolutionary praxis already present 
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in and around it, at work in the world and against the systems of domination that the 
Church itself is historically associated with. 
 
4. Summary 
 The case against Liberation Theology from within the Magisterium is largely 
oriented towards the questions of orthodoxy: that is, maintaining the ideological integrity 
of the Church. Such critiques seem to ring hollow from the Latin American libratory 
perspective, which is historically, geographically, and culturally situated in such a way 
that it must confront the hegemonic effects of coloniality (wherever they may manifest). 
Furthermore, the arguments for reductionism in the Theology of Liberation also do not 
reflect the levels of signification of the notion of ‘Liberation’ nor the centrality of the 
totalizing category of ‘sin.’ The process of salvation described by the Holy See is instead 
limited to the salvation of the individual relative to their soul, and only secondarily has 
implications for the community of faith. In this sense, ‘sin’ and ‘salvation’ are properly 
religious categories. ‘Sin’ (understood in the sense of this essay) and ‘liberation,’ on the 
other hand, are categories that are effective at the level of the individual and the 
community, and that have implications in the praxis of human beings. In this way they 
are properly categories of ethics, and not just religion. 
 
B. Criticism of the Principles of Liberation 
 There are, however, moments within the Magisterium’s critique that do in fact 
raise troubling questions for the Theology of Liberation. The first of these is the ongoing 
structural violence that appears to be inherent in human history. True, the “sin of the 
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world” is pervasive and thoroughgoing, yet within the literature of Liberation Theology it 
is firmly asserted that the Kingdom of God, in which the poor are liberated from the 
domination of the system, is “in our midst.” The question of what is meant by the 
“utopian” character of the Kingdom of Heaven, then, remains live. Furthermore, whether 
or not the preferential option for the poor is a proper basis for a praxis of liberation in 
community remains an issue: is the absolute imperative to “Liberate the poor” an ethical 
maxim, or does it, as Benedict XVI claims, reinforce conflict that is uncharacteristic and 
even antithetical to the Reign of God? 
 Secondly, because the principle ‘Liberate the Poor’ is derived from the idea that 
“the poor are the victims of sin,” a rethinking of the principle would imply a rethinking of 
what constitutes a ‘sin’ and a ‘sinner.’ Thinking about sin in terms of community first and 
foremost, as opposed to the individual, may be one way to reconstitute the notion of 
liberation to more effectively achieve the ethical goals of a praxis of liberation. 
 
1. The Preferential Option for the Poor 
 As has been seen in both the literature of the Theology of Liberation and the 
words of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, the evangelical mission of the Body of Christ 
(the Church) is to free human beings from lives of slavery and oppression. The 
oppression is totalizing, in that it inhibits an individual’s subjectivity and God-given 
capacity for agency and teleological fulfillment. Every person is understood to have a 
place in the order of Creation, but that place is determined not just by the relative 
rightness or wrongness of their free-willing: factors beyond their control impose 
limitations upon their ability to will freely; their ability to flourish is impeded from 
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without by political, economic, and social pressures, all of which are the product of the 
collectivization of human agency. When many persons combine their personal energies to 
instantiate a course of action that transcends each individual (but nonetheless requires 
their participation), over time and space such action crystallizes into systems and 
structures that operate at a level beyond the individual, yet still within the world. As is 
often the case, however, the exclusion of others during the development of these 
structures, whether because of geographical or temporal distance from the site of their 
formation, can lead to moments of conflict at the periphery of the world-economic 
system. Herein lays the rub: how can one include an Other in one’s system, with all of its 
prefabricated constraints and demands, without imposing it? That is, how, in generating a 
new sense of community, can one avoid the pitfall of instantiating something akin to the 
“coloniality of Being” present in the history of Latin America? 
 This is the trouble with the idea of the “Kingdom of God.” As the name denotes, 
it is an authoritarian concept: the Kingdom of God has a king, an imposed political order, 
and a geographical and chronological realm. In the traditional sense of the term, the 
Kingdom is utterly transcendent; it exists outside of humanity’s lived experience and is 
the sight from which God enjoys the glory of the Creation. In the sense given it by 
Theology of Liberation, the Kingdom is a utopia, present in potentia in human 
experience; it is an organization of humankind in which genuine person-to-person 
communication is possible, in which the rich are poor and the poor are rich. The 
Kingdom is future-oriented: it is always outside of history. Just as the apostles waited 
eagerly for the Parousia that they expected within a generation, so too does the Kingdom 
of God lurk on the temporal and geopolitical periphery of human experience, obscured by 
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the injustice of the present world. Just as the sin of the dominator is masked by the 
ideology of the system, so too is the hope of the victim covered over. 
 What then, does it mean to take on the “perspective of the poor”? Is not this 
perspective equally clouded by the present system? And does not the cause of liberation 
imply an assertion of the Reign of God, the hegemony of the so-called righteous? 
Dussel’s exhortation to continuously be on the lookout for the poor seems to imply that 
liberation is not a singular teleological progression in history, but an ongoing cycle in 
which the poor revolt against the sinfulness of the system (and those who enact it), then 
become the dominators themselves. Furthermore, this cycle has no geographical or 
chronological rhyme or reason to it: it is not a unilateral Hegelian movement of history, 
nor is it the epiphany of Kingdom of Heaven once and for all through the Parousia. 
Instead, it is driven by the conflict at the periphery of the Reign of the Prince of This 
World, even as the position of that dominion continues to move. Pinpointing the 
perspective of the poor is thus risky at best and impossible at worst. 
 Is the maxim to “Liberate the Poor” misleading? It is at least confusing by virtue 
of its presuppositions of conflict and identity, its utopianism, and its cyclical character. If 
the process of liberation promised in the Gospel is to be achieved, a better understanding 
of how one comes to be both sinner and victim needs to be achieved. 
 
2. Another Perspective 
 The preferential option for the poor falls prey to the ideological tendencies it 
seeks to overcome: in this way it reinstitutes a closed system (a “Kingdom”) over and 
over. An ethic that tends towards such ongoing conflict does not reflect the hope and 
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promise of the Gospel (namely a permanent and abiding peace in relation to God). On the 
other hand, to turn back to the definition of salvation given by the Magisterium is to give 
up the possibility of a truly total liberation that (a) transcends the religious and addresses 
the whole being of a person, (b) brings about a community of genuine fellowship and 
justice, and (c) is free of the epistemological and ontological limitations of ideology. In 
the following section of the essay, I will propose that such a view of liberation can be 
found in the philosophy of Josiah Royce, and in particular in his discussion of what he 
calls the “Christian doctrine of Life”
134
 in The Problem of Christianity. In this work, 
Royce presents what I consider to be a superior principle for an ethical building up of 
community, namely the principle of “Loyalty,” which is oriented towards a unifying 
principle that binds persons together across time and space, yet which also allows for the 
unconstrained expression of individual subjectivity. Furthermore, in this work Royce 
describes the breakdown of community in terms of “betrayal,” which I see as a third way 
of conceiving of sin to be added to those already analyzed. From this additional analysis, 
a potentially comprehensive definition of sin will emerge as an ethical category in terms 
of human praxis and community. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ROYCE’S PRINCIPLES OF LOYALTY AND COMMUNITY 
 Originally delivered as the Hibbert Lectures at Oxford in 1913, The Problem of 
Christianity is the quintessential text of the later work of Josiah Royce. Frank 
Oppenheim, in his foreword to the fifth edition of the text, calls the text “a serious, 
thorough, and reasonable interpretation” of what Royce took to be “the most essential 
beliefs of Christianity.”
135
 It is the culmination of years of contending with religious 
questions and problems, dating back to his first major work (The Sources of Religious 
Insight) and beyond. Oppenheim notes that, as a young man, Royce was “caught between 
the practical Christian service of his devoted, mystical, and Bible-centered mother and 
that ‘higher criticism’ of the Bible he encountered as a twenty-year-old in Germany. All 
these tensions induced in the young Royce a love-hate relationship toward Christianity as 
he found it.”
136
 Growing up in the frontier home of pious, if not particularly ‘churched’ 
Christian parents introduced Royce to a Christian faith that could be seen and 
experienced in everyday life. Yet his intellectual development also brought him to 
question the metaphysical claims underlying this piety.
137
 What we see in The Problem of 
Christianity is a critical engagement with the core beliefs Royce distilled through a career 
of engagement with religious questions. These beliefs, summarized in brief, are what 
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Royce calls “The Christian Doctrine of Life,” that is, his understanding of the notion of 
salvation through community that forms the basis for truly Christian living, and “the 
Principle of Loyalty” that comes about as the ethical implication of this doctrine. In 
laying out in detail his interpretation of these ideas, Royce provides insights into the ways 
in which the Kingdom of God is built up here and now as human community in spite of 
the sins of the world. 
 
A. Loyalty and Community 
 As in the Theology of Liberation, the departure for Royce’s analysis of Christian 
living begins in the vagueness of the ethical core of the New Testament: the Sermon on 
the Mount. 
The Master freely speaks of what he calls the Kingdom of Heaven. And the 
Kingdom of Heaven appears, on its very face, to be some sort of social order, 
some sort of collective life, some kind of community. Yet the reported sayings do 
not, when taken by themselves, make perfectly explicit what that social order, 
what that community, is to which the name Kingdom of Heaven is intended to 
apply.
138
 
The conclusion Royce derives from this observation, however, is not nearly as specific as 
that of the Liberation Theologian: instead, he rather conservatively proposes that “There 
is a certain universal and divine spiritual community. Membership in that community is 
necessary to the salvation of man.”
 139
 The essential feature of this divine community is 
its oneness, its capacity to act as a singular unit over and above the individual member. 
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The community is a “real unity” of disparate persons, and as such “the individual 
member…may be devoted to it as if it were his friend or father, may serve it, may live 
and die for it.”
140
 This devotion, found not only in Christian communities but everywhere 
where two and three are gathered in a “cause which unites many selves in one,”
141
 Royce 
calls “Loyalty:” “For a loyal human being the interest of the community to which he 
belongs is superior to every merely individual interest of his own. He actively devotes 
himself to this cause…To the individual the loyal spirit appeals by fixing his attention 
upon a life incomparably vaster than his own individual life.”
142
 Royce asserts that the 
natural state of the human being is in conflict with his or her neighbor: “This curse is 
rooted in the primal constitution which makes man social, and which adapts him to win 
his intelligence through social conflicts with his neighbors.”
143
 Human communities are 
brought together by the desires and intentions of individual human beings towards an 
ideal that cannot be expressed or achieved in their singular existence: it is bigger than 
each of them individually. The ideal is situated historically and culturally: it is arises out 
of the shared experience of many individuals in a specific time and place. Furthermore, 
loyalty can be recognized in the life of those united in distinct communities formed 
around different ideals: Royce explains, “On a more highly self-conscious level the loyal 
spirit tends to assume the form of chivalry. The really devoted and considerate warrior 
learns to admire the loyalty of his foe; yes, even to depend upon it for some of his own 
best inspirtation…Kindred clans learn to respect and, ere long, to share one another’s 
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loyalty…The loyal are, in ideal, essentially kin.”
144
 The level of the “ideal community,” 
the level at which loyalty itself is the ultimate principle, encompasses all of humankind 
for Royce: it is not some theoretical extension of the principle, but the real ideal he 
perceives in the Pauline interpretation of the injunction to “Love thy neighbor.” In Paul’s 
thought, Royce sees the Christian doctrine of love joined with the practical principle of 
loyalty: “Both the neighbor and the lover of the neighbor to whom the Apostle appeals 
are, to his mind, members of the body of Christ; and all the value of each man as an 
individual is bound up with his membership in this body, and with his love for the 
community.”
145
 This assertion prompts the next driving question of Royce’s project: 
“What is the nature and the worth of the individual man?”
146
 The worth of the individual, 
according to Royce, is in their loyalty: “Loyalty of the type that is in question when our 
salvation, in Paul’s sense of salvation, is to be won, is the loyalty which springs up after 
the individual self-will has been trained.”
147
 True loyalty, and not mere tribalism or 
provincialism, is manifested as an act of the will: it is the active claim that “I am loyal to 
this cause not because of familiarity or acculturation, but because it is an object of my 
love.” Royce goes on to explain that “In order to be thus lovable to the critical and 
naturally rebellious soul, the Beloved Community must be quite unlike a natural social 
group…This community must be an union of members who first love it. The unity of 
love must pervade it, before the individual member can find it lovable.”
148
 This pervasive 
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character of love is “some miracle of grace (as it would seem) [that] can initiate the new 
life, either in the individuals who are to love their communities, or in the communities 
that are to be worthy of their love.”
149
 
 As in the Theology of Liberation, Royce puts heavy emphasis upon the historicity 
of the formation of the community and the active loyalty of its members. Communities 
function in the world: they are not Kingdoms of Heaven outside of time, but possess a 
past, present, and future identity. Royce calls communities in which the members identify 
with one another on the basis of the same experience of some past event “communities of 
memory,” and ones where the members share an expectation of the same future event 
“communities of hope”: 
A community, whether of memory or of hope, exists relatively to the past or 
future facts to which its several members stand in the common relation just 
defined. The concept of community depends upon the interpretation which each 
individual member gives to his own self,—to his own past—,and to his own 
future…How rich this community is in meaning, in value, in membership, in 
significant organization, will depend upon the selves that enter into the 
community, and upon the ideals in terms of which they define themselves, their 
past, and their future.
150
 
Unlike in the Theology of Liberation, where the richness of the community is defined in 
terms of a singular existential ideal (the person-to-person relationships), the Beloved 
Community Royce describes is characterized by the historical content imbued in it by its 
members. In this way, Royce leaves more theoretical room for the identity of the 
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community to be expressed, rather than putting it purely in terms of domination and 
conflict. Furthermore, this also allows for the possibility of communities which possess 
differing, though non-competing ideals. Such a view is more conducive to the more 
peaceful and less revolutionary interpretations of the Christian scripture. 
 The ideal community, however, remains a somewhat vacuous concept for Royce: 
“The universal and beloved community is still hidden from our imperfect human view, 
and will remain so, how long we know not.”
151
 Royce’s emphasis on fallibilism when it 
comes to the specific ideals which will characterize the ideal human community can be 
viewed as a problematic lack of direction for ethical praxis; on the other hand, it can also 
be seen as both a recognition of the human condition and an opportunity for creative and 
novel human activity:  “The principle of principles in all Christian morals remains this:—
‘Since you cannot find the universal and beloved community—create it.’ And this again, 
applied to the concrete art of living, means: Do whatever you can to take a step towards 
it, or to assist anybody…to take steps towards the organization of that coming 
community.”
152
 Instead of asserting an ethical principle that presupposes states of being 
that define and condition how and why individual human beings can act, Royce leaves 
the door open to each individual to ascertain the best way forward toward the Beloved 
Community; in this way, he avoids the pitfalls of lending the principle of loyalty to any 
one specific nation, class, and Church. Instead, all of these must seek to broaden their 
perspective to that of the Universal Community. “See, then, in every man the branch of 
such a vine,—the outflowing of such a purpose,—the beloved of such a spirit, the 
incarnation of such a divine concern for many in one. And then your Christian love will 
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be much more than amiable pity…For its object is the Beloved Community, and the 
individual as, ideally, a member of that community.”
153
 
  
B. Betrayal and Atonement 
 Where, in Royce’s system, does sin come into play? The principle of Loyalty is 
indeed lofty enough to impose a strict ethical standard upon a person: it is characterized 
by the necessity for reasoned perception of one’s world and one’s fellow human being, as 
well as the fortitude of spirit to act in the interests of something grander than oneself. 
Theorizing from his own experience, Royce avers that “Whoever, through grace, has 
found the beloved of his life, and now freely lives the life of love, knows that he could, if 
chose, betray the beloved. And he knows what estimate his own free choice now requires 
him to put upon such betrayal.”
154
 With the freedom to love likewise comes the freedom 
to betray: it is a fact which Royce calls each person to judge from their experience to be 
true. He only goes so far as to say that “The common experience of mankind seems to 
show that such actual and deliberate sin against the light, such conscious and willful 
treason, occasionally takes place.”
155
 As in the traditional definition of sin, the effects of 
this willful betrayal are immediately evident to the sinner: “That fact, that event, that 
deed, is irrevocable. The fact that I am the one who then did thus and so, not ignorantly, 
but knowingly,—that fact will outlast the ages. That fact is as endless as time.”
156
 
Whether for good or ill, the key effect of such a betrayal is its endurance, its permanence; 
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it is a part of the history of the individual that cannot be gone back upon. In the voice of 
the sinner, Royce asserts that “I can do good deeds in future; but I cannot revoke my 
individual past deed…Nothing that I myself can do will ever really reconcile me to my 
own deed, so far as it was that treason.”
157
The corruption of self that this occasions is 
only in terms of his or her Loyalty, and the perpetuation of that loyalty. 
 In this way, however, the effect of the sin transcends the individual’s experience. 
For as it was a violation of the principle to which he or she was loyal, a principle shared 
in community, the community is likewise affected by the betrayal. 
What human ties the traitor broke, we leave to him to discover for himself. Why 
they were to his mind holy, we also need not now inquire….He destroyed by his 
deed the community in whose brotherhood, in whose life, in whose spirit, he had 
found his guide and his ideal. His deed, then, concerns not himself only, but that 
community whereof he was a voluntary member.
158
  
The discovery of the traitor’s sin is evident in the breakdown of the community, whether 
that be catastrophic or relatively minor. Either way, the act of treason, the sin of the 
individual, calls into question how the community can persevere as a unity while 
“[reconciling] itself to the existence of traitors in its world, and to the deed of individual 
traitors.”
159
 Just as the sin of the individual is an irrevocable and everlasting feature of the 
individual’s history, so too does the betrayal of the community become a fact of its 
history and a potential impediment to its persistence in the future. The facticity of the 
deed means that there can be no “forgiveness” according to Royce: instead, there can 
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only be “atonement”: “This triumph over treason can only be accomplished by the 
community, or on behalf of the community, through some steadfastly loyal servant who 
acts, so to speak, as the incarnation of the very spirit of the community itself….The 
world, as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else 
remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all.”
160
 The atonement 
of the community (and not the sinner) is what propels the community into a new creation, 
one that both required and overcame the act of betrayal which sundered the unity of the 
community in the first place. Simply “repairing” the disunity of the community is 
impossible due to the facticity of human activity; however, surmounting the negative act 
through a new creation is what gives the community a newly conceived ideal or purpose 
towards which to strive. In this sense, the possibility for reconciliation of the traitor 
comes through the adoption of this new ideal, even as the previous order is left behind. 
 This sort of action is precisely what is meant by “analectic” activity in history: the 
surpassing of present systems bogged down by the sinful acts of its members. Atonement 
is utopian, yet only in terms of the past system. Indeed, in the present, loyalty always 
pursues an end in view, and thanks to the courageous sacrifice of the community and/or 
its representatives, a new end is put forth to reorient its members towards a new hope. 
 This system does not expiate the sinner of his or her sin; it instead provides the 
opportunity for redemption in his or her life, the chance to reorient the self in terms of a 
universal telos, and also to hold in memory the facticity of his or her betrayal. Past, 
present, and future all come together in the moment of atonement and the recommitment 
to the principle of loyalty. At the same time, unlike Liberation Theology, the categories 
of domination (‘sinner’ and ‘poor’) are not imposed upon experience: rather, the 
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judgment of sin is in terms of the sinner’s perception of his or her own loyalty, and in 
terms of the unity or disunity of the community. The Gospel message to be reconciled to 
one’s neighbor demands loyalty to the principles which bind one to the other, and not 
merely the recognition of personhood and the provision of material charity (i.e. “feeding 
the poor”). 
 
C. Summary 
 In the Theology of Liberation, the effects of sin are located in the body of the 
Other, in the victim of systems of oppression that transcend the individual, yet that 
nonetheless are constituted by the sins of individual persons. In Royce’s depiction of the 
Beloved Community, the sinful betrayal of the community is always the act of one of its 
members, but has effects upon the experience of both the sinner and at the transcendent 
level of the community. The loyalty required of the individual is a somewhat miraculous 
upwelling of the spirit towards a principle that extends far beyond the reach of one 
person: when it comes to be shared by others, whether through common experience or 
common expectation, a community is generated which calls upon its members to prefer 
the sanctity of their shared ideal. At the broadest level, the Beloved Community 
encompasses all human life, and in turn imbues each of its members with the fullness of 
the experience of the universal. Unlike the Theology of Liberation, where the historicity 
of liberation is oriented towards geopolitical conflict put in terms of the poor and the 
oppressor, the Beloved Community is an absolute ideal and telos that eschews the 
conflict of this world. Its achievement, however, is fleeting: Royce recognizes and 
cautions his audience to attend to human fallibilism and the radical freedom that allows 
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humanity to will both loyalty and betrayal. In this sense, the epistemic demands of the 
Beloved Community far outpace those of the Theology of Liberation, wherein the 
principle “Liberate the Poor” is seen as an absolute maxim for human praxis. Royce 
instead proposes the ethic of loyalty, that is, the continuous extension of the whole of 
one’s intentions beyond oneself to a principle that transcends any individualistic purpose. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
A. Royce and Liberation Theology 
Josiah Royce’s interpretation of Christian ethics of community is a theoretically 
stimulating articulation of an absolute ethic that emerges from and as a response to lived 
experience. The ideals that human beings are called to be loyal to are as diverse as the 
experiences and cultures of the people themselves: yet across this plurality, the 
overarching principle of Loyalty to the community (and its reciprocal engendering of 
loyalty and love) points to the kind of ethic that can bring about a Beloved Community 
able to withstand the betrayal and sin of its members against it and endure. 
Royce is hard-pressed, however, to give any clear, historical example of such a 
community. This does not seem to be his intention in The Problem of Christianity: 
instead, he is explicating the theoretical and epistemic structures that support the 
everyday praxis of people-in-the-world. In this way, Royce’s analysis functions best as a 
philosophical lens through which to analyze historical movements, such as that of 
Liberation Theology. A Roycean may ask of the Theology of Liberation, “Is there an 
ideal here that orients a community? Is there a call to loyalty? Does the community 
engender loyalty?” On the other hand, the Liberation Theologian may ask of Royce, 
“What is the history that informs your ethics? Who are the people in your Beloved 
Community? Who is excluded?” There is a fundamental difference methodologically 
evident between Liberation Theology and Royce’s philosophical analysis of Christian 
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ethics, yet it seems to me that this only provides for a richer synthesis when the two are 
thought together. 
The history of colonialism and coloniality in Latin America is what gives life to 
the commentary of the Theology of Liberation: the suffering of indigenous populations 
under the conquistadores, the pervasive racism and classism that continues to keep people 
on the brink of death (and push many over it), the degraded workers, and those who are 
forever disabled by the traumas of war and violence, when they are seen clearly behind 
the ideological obfuscations of the global Center, reveal the depth of the sin of the world 
and its effects. Theologians who see the face of the other cannot help but turn their gazes 
from on high to the person before them, yet in that person-to-person relation a higher 
ideal is born, an ideal that inspires and demands their loyalty. If the wages of sin are 
death, both for the other and for the sinner, than the reward for service to the life of the 
poor, their salvation, is the gift of the Beloved Community. On the ground, in Latin 
America, the Beloved Community is everywhere where the theology of liberation 
becomes a praxis of liberation: it is what calls the Church of Latin America to be unique, 
devoted to the ideal called forth from the experience of Latin@s. 
On the flipside, however, Royce’s philosophy of loyalty could be thought to 
reinforce the rule of the system, the loyalty of those in power. This would be an 
interpretation of the world community as a “community of memory,” one that reflects the 
history of conquest and seeks to nostalgically maintain it. Yet the apocalyptic vision of 
Christian hope, expressed in the words of Jesus in the Gospels, by St. Paul in his letters, 
and in the Revelation, must be the more fitting way to understand the Christian Church: 
i.e., as a “community of hope.” Any loyalty to a past of oppression and violence would 
 78
only engender more violence: yet loyalty to the hope of a peaceful, just, and equitable 
world where the first are last and the last first is an ideal that orients history toward the 
good news of the Gospel. 
Over and against this emphasis on the future, however, I think that Dussel in 
particular would argue that the memory of the poor, the experience of the indigenous who 
suffered in slavery under the conquistadores, for instance, is a vital to the revolt against 
the system. To ignore the past for the sake of some future glory would be the kind of 
naïve utopianism that Dussel sees as misleading. In this way, the Christian community 
working towards liberation would have to be in some sense a community of memory; yet 
it would not be a community of memory in the sense that the Magisterium would see as 
necessary: that is to say, the Church would not be bound up in static practices and 
doctrines simply for the sake of tradition and dogma. Only by seeing the history of the 
Church in terms of its future glory as the just and equitable Reign of God can there be 
enough freedom from the system to build up the Beloved Community. 
 
B. What Kind of Ethics Should We Hope For? 
This study endeavored to examine what significance the theological concept of 
sin has when it comes to ethics beyond the realm of the religious piety. What became 
evident was that the language of sin gives philosophers and ethicists a way of talking 
about the effects of human agency in experience that goes beyond cultural, political, 
legal, or conventional modes of right and wrong. Putting oppression and suffering in 
terms of sin makes clear the ontological and existential effects that the conflicts and 
conquests of human history have wrought. It raises the level of discourse to that of a 
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transcendental, absolute norm wherein the present system can be confronted, judged, and 
responded to at the level of structures of power, as well as the individual person’s actions. 
In the case of the theological analysis, we saw categories of judgment emerge from 
scripture (Amistad, love for one’s neighbor); through the historical methodology of 
Liberation thinkers, we saw that it was the revelation of the face of suffering that 
prompted an orientation toward life and away from death; finally, out of Royce’s analysis 
we culled the means to judge how well those standards are adhered to, providing a 
criterion for ethical implementation and operation of absolute norms in the context of 
human history. From this methodological synthesis born on the border of philosophy and 
theology, I believe that the notions of sin and reconciliation examined here provide for 
deeper, more thoroughgoing grounds for ethical exhortation and adjudication. This is, 
after all, what Royce tells us is the historical telos of all philosophical endeavors: “to 
bring to pass, or to move towards, the salvation of man.” 
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